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CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR CREATING A
TOXIC ENVIRONMENT: MENS REA,
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
STANDARDS, AND THE NEUROTOXICITY
HYPOTHESIS
COLIN CRAWFORD*

Recent research in brain biochemistry examining the likely neurological
effects of exposure to toxic contaminantscontinues to demand legal consideration. In this Article, Professor Crawford evaluates the possible consequences of recent neurobiologicalstudies-labeled "The Neurotoxicity Hypothesis" by researchers-for lawyers and the legal system. After
summarizing the research,ProfessorCrawford suggests that as this (or similar)neurobiologicalresearchgains increasedscientific acceptance, it will be
necessary to reduce dramatically the acceptable levels of these toxic elements
that can be dischargedinto the environment.He then examines the implications of such a resultfor establishingcriminal liability underfederal environmental statutes,focusing on the criminal liability provisions of the Federal WaterPollutionControlAct.
INTRODUCTION

Throughout the 1990s, American politicians and bureaucrats engaged in a sustained and self-congratulatory celebration of the de-

cline in the nation's violent crime rate.1 New York's mayor, Rudolph
Giuliani, proudly declared upon his 1997 re-election that, as a result
*Associate Professor, ThomasJefferson School of Law, San Diego.
An early version of this Article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law & So-

ciety Association held in Chicago, Illinois on May 27-30, 1999.Jessie Allen, Elizabeth Harris, and other attendees at that presentation provided useful comments. The readings of
Suzette Brooks, Eve Cary, Marjorie Cohn, Jerry Wallingford, and Ellen Waldman also
helped, as did that of Dr. Joan Esnayra. Although some of them disagreed with aspects of
the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis and my take on its legal implications, their comments were
uniformly helpful to me, and for that I am grateful.Joseph A. Tontodonato, Class of 2000,
provided able research assistance. I am also grateful to Dean Kenneth Vandevelde and a
ThomasJefferson summer research grant for assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines "violent" crimes as one of four
types: murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, FB11998PreliminaryAnnual Release, UNIFORM CRIME REP. (1999).
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of his administration's anti-crime efforts, "[m]illions have been liberated from the reality and fear of crime."2 Mayor Giuliani is not alone
in taking credit for the much ballyhooed reduction in the United
States's violent crime rates.3 Yet it is worth remembering that more
sober assessments of the decline in crime rates have been uncertain as
to the exact causes. 4 Furthermore, new research suggests that Mayor
Giuliani and his compatriots around the country may not deserve
much of the credit they are taking for the decline in violent crime
rates. This research, labeled "the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis" by its
progenitors, 5 suggests that the long-term benefits of more stringent
environmental laws and regulations (and specifically the passage of
the lead control laws of the early 197 0s), 6 may have played a key role
2

Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Second Inaugural Address at City Hall in New York City,
New York (Jan. 1, 1998), available at <http://iww.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/html/secondi
naug.html>.
3 For instance, in New York City alone, for the period 1993-97, officials reported that
murders were down by 60.2%, -armed robberies by 48.4%, and rapes by 13.5%. See Office of
the Mayor of the City of New York, Press Release No. 006-97, available at <http://
wwwci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/html/98a/prOO6-98/htnfl>. Throughout the 1990s, similar
reductions have been registered across the country. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Homicides
Decline Below 1964 Level in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at Al; John H. Gushman, Jr., Serious Cime Fell in U.S. For6th Year in a Row in '97,
N.Y. TINms, May 18, 1998, at
A14; EdJahn, Caiformia's Crime Rate Drops to 30-yearLow, SAN DIEGo UmoN-Thm.,June 16,
1998, at B2; Eric Lichtblau, Cime Rates Continue Record 7-Year Plunge, LA Trims, May 17,
1999, at Al; Frank Main, MurdersareDownAgain in Chicago,Cm. SuN-Thms,June 30,1999,
at 30 (reporting that the local murder rate is at a ten-year low); Major Crime Down in State
Cities, LA DAILY NEws, Feb. 24, 1999, at N3; Ruth L. McKinnie, Local Homicide Rates Continue to Drop, SAN DmGo UNIoN-Thm., Mar. 29, 1998, at Bi; Miami MurderRate Falls to a 20Year Low, AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2525156. But see Bill
Bryan, City Ranks No. 1 in Cime Per Capita, FBIReports Police ChiefDisputesFindingsfor '98:
"Crme Has Been Going Down," ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, June 4, 1999, at Al (reporting
that, adjusting for population, St. Louis had the highest rates of crime nationally); Graham
Rayman, TroublingPublicSafety Report, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1999, at A06 (noting increases in
New York City homicide rates for the first half of 1999).
4
See,e.g., Fox Butterfield, Decline of Violent Crimes is Linked to Crack Market, N.Y. ThmEs,
Dec. 28, 1998, at 5 (citing the likely importance of decline in crack cocaine sales); Fox
Butterfield, Many Cities in U.S. Show Sharp Drop in HomicideRate, N.Y. TWMES, Aug. 13, 1995,
at 1; Clifford Krauss, Mystery of New York, the Suddenly Safer City, N.Y. TMNos, July 23, 1995,
§ 4, at 1; Neal R. Peirce, ThePrison Craze and the CrimeRate, SAN DxmEo UmoN-Thm.,Jan. 5,
1999, at B9 (identifying possible explanations for declines in crime rates).
5
See infra Section I.
6The most prominent of these is the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4821-4846 (1999). Others include 15 U.S.C. §§ 2681-2692 (1999) (setting forth
various measures to effect lead exposure reduction) (original provisions enacted in 1976
and amended in 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1999) (regulation of fuel additives) (basic statutory provisions enacted in 1967); 42 U.S.C. § 4831 (1999) (lead-based housepaint). The
manufacture of lead-based paint was prohibited in 1977 pursuant to a regulation promulgated by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. See 16 C.F.R. Pt. 1303 (West 2000). See
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in the reductions in violent criminal behavior that have been registered in this decade. Research into the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis further raises the possibility that the most trumpeted aspects of late 20th
century criminal law enforcement-more beat cops, "three strikes"
sentencing, and accelerated use of the death penalty-may not have
the deterrent effects on criminal activity claimed by their advocates. 7
On the contrary, if conclusively established, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis will force reconsideration of the dominant causal explanations for violent crime.
Simply put, the hypothesis suggests that certain environmental
stimulae should be viewed as significant co-factors that likely contribute
to violent criminal behavior. The consequences of the hypothesis for
regulation of criminal behavior are, however, anything but simple.
Prevailing notions of criminology tend to rely upon social development models that pay "a great deal of attention to social setting and
social learning, with special attention to groups rather than individuals."8 The Neurotoxicity Hypothesis complicates this picture considerably, and in at least two respects. First, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis
generally statutes cited infra note 29; Colin Crawford, 7rnds in the Regulation of Lead, 2
ENvL. L. N.Y. 145 (1991).
7 See supranote 3; see alsoEdJahn, CaliforniaCrime Rate Drops to 30-YearLow, SAN DIEGO
UmoN-ThB., June 16, 1998, at B2 (crediting the "three-strikes law"); Rick Orlov & Phillip
W. Browne, Valley Crime Plunges; Latest Statistics Reflect 6-Year Trend, L.A. DAmY NEws, July
15, 1999, at N1 (quoting LAPD Commander Val Paniccia crediting the "three strikes" law
and aggressive community policing for driving down crime); VmcentJ. Schodolski, Experts
Split OverEffect of "3 Strikes" Laws on Crime, Cm. Thm., Mar. 3, 1999, at 7 (reporting that
statistics reflect a crime decrease and prison population increase in the twenty-four states
that have adopted "three strikes" or other similar laws); John Strauss, Democrats, Peterson
Ready to Make Run, Mayoral CandidateWins Party Support and Callsfor CollaborativeCampaigning, INDiANAPois STAR, Feb. 18, 1999, at C01 (reporting that Mayor Stephen Goldsmith
noted an overall decrease in crime in Indianapolis as a result of more funding for the police); Sue Weibezahl & Erik Kriss, Some Sad, Some Pleased by "Death," Opponents Say Penalty
Wrong, PosT-STimAmI, Aug. 21, 1999, at A3 (quoting New York State Senator Dale Volker
attributing drop in murder and crime rates to New York's capital punishment law). But see
Mike Kataoka, "Three Strikes" Law Not Working Study Says But Prosecutors Dispute Institute's
Findings,PREss ENTERPR sE, Mar. 3, 1999, at A03 (evaluating the Justice Policy Institute's
findings and theorizing that an improved economy and the leveling off of the crack cocaine trade are reasons for the crime reduction); Scot Leigh & Frank Phillips, Views of Cellucci, Professor Characeie DeathPenalty Issue, BosToN GLOBE, Mar. 22, 1999, at B4 (stating
that there is little public clamor for a capital punishment law because the crime rate of
Massachusetts is down so significantly).
SC. Ray Jeffery, Ciminology and CriminalLaw: Science Versus Policy and the Interaction of
Science and Law, in AnvANczs IN CRI3MNOLOGICAL TmORY 3, 8 (1999) [hereinafter Criminology and CriminalLaw]. See also C. Rayjeffery, The Prevention ofJuvenile Violence 3 (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of CrininalJustice Sciences, Mar. 13,
1998) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
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will require expanding the field of analysis. That is, although the hypothesis does not discount the importance of social setting and social
learning, it does demand that the field of inquiry be broadened considerably, so that students of criminal behavior consider not merely
social stimulae-such as poverty, poor nutrition, and unhealthy living
conditions-but also neurological functions. Furthermore, integrating biochemical information into assessments of criminal behavior
will require distinguishing between individuals rather than just looking at criminals as a group. It will also require lawyers to draw upon
not merely sociological data, but also to learn from biology and neurochemistry.
This Article will identify areas of concern for lawyers and judges
in light of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. It proceeds on the assumption that ongoing neuroscience research demands lawyers' attention.
As data supporting the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis continues to accumulate and gain wider acceptance, this research seems likely to affect
the future content and administration not only of U.S. criminal law,
but also of U.S. environmental law. Those better situated to do so
have already begun to limn the outlines of an affirmative criminal defense in light of neurotoxic contamination. 9 In what follows, my aimas an environmental lawyer-is somewhat different. I offer a preliminary exploration of the consequences of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis
for U.S. environmental law.O The Article is divided into three main
9

SeeDeborah W. Denno, ConsideringLead Poisoningas a CriminalDefense, 20 FoaRnAM

URn. LJ. 377, 385 (1993) (stating that "[e]ven in a racially and environmentally homoge-

neous sample of children, environmental factors predominated in predicting who would
be a criminal").
1
0 In related contexts, lawyers have begun to take note of the importance of biological
knowledge to the law. See generally DEnoRAH W. DzENo, BIOLOGY AND VioLuNcE: FRom
BRTH To ADuLTHOOD (1990) (reporting and analyzing the results of "the Biosocial Project," a study of 1000 individuals in Philadelphia from birth to young adulthood); Deborah
W. Denno, Gende, Crime, and the CriminalLaw Defenses, 85 J. CGUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80
(1994); Deborah J. [sic] Denno, Neuropsychologicaland Early Environmental Correlates of Sex
Dfferences in Crime, 23 INT'LJ. NEuaoscmNcE 199 (1984); Deborah W. Denno, Sociological
and Human DevelopmentalExplanationsof Crime: Conflict or Consensus?,23 CRIMNOLOGY 711
(1985); E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 595
(1997); Owen D. Jones, EvolutionaryAnalysis in the Law: An Introduction and Application to
Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1117 (1997) (positing the value of biological approaches to
legal analysis); Owen D.Jones, Law and Biology: Toward an IntegratedModel of Human Behavior, 8 J. CorNrmn. LEGAL Issuzs 167 (1997) (arguing for more cross-disciplinary fertilization to develop a model of human behavior not rooted in traditional social science models); Owen D.Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape, 87 CAL. L. REv. 827 (1999); Vicki
Quade, HairMay Hold the Secret, 69 A.B.A. J. 1814 (1983) (reporting chemical imbalances
as a possible cause of violent behavior).
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parts. Part I will more fully describe the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis and
related research in brain biochemistry. Part I will also emphasize aspects of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis likely to prove relevant for U.S.
law, focusing in particular on mens rea and standards of liability.
Part II is the heart of the Article and, as such, it merits discussion
in outline form here. The law need not only consider the mens rea of
individuals who commit violent crimes due to neurotoxicity, but also
of those who create the toxic conditions that result in neurotoxicity.
As a result, Part II concentrates on the criminal enforcement features
of federal environmental statutes as they relate to the evidence in
support of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. Part II will identify those
respects in which the criminal provisions in federal environmental
laws are ill-equipped to respond to the increasingly convincing evidence presented by the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. This is especially
true given continuing concern in the courts and among legal commentators that the standards used to enforce federal environmental
laws, especially criminal provisions, are ambiguous. Part II argues that
this is largely because courts and commentators continue to differ
about the proper standard of liability for regulatory crimes?'
Part II further suggests that unless the liability standards in the
major federal environmental law statutes are reconsidered in light of
this neurotoxicity research, the credibility and widespread acceptance
of criminal enforcement of U.S. environmental laws could be seriously compromised.1 2 Neurotoxicity research will, once further confirmed, almost certainly compel the relevant environmental regulatory authority to lower, perhaps significantly, the acceptable levels of
toxic metals able to be discharged into the environment. Presumably,
1 See infraSection
12

.A.lb.
The legal arguments outlined in Sections II and In, infra, do not rest solely upon

the ultimate credence given what has been labeled "the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis." On the
contrary, the argument advanced in this Article is animated by the belief that if not this
research, then other neurobiological and/or neurochemical research will force attention
to the issues considered here. Samples of scientific and social scientific research that promise to demand legal consideration in coming years include, generally, MARGAPET GRUTER,
LAW AND THE MIND: BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1991); LAW, BIOLOGY &
CULTrUE (Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannan eds., 1983); THE SENSE OF JUsTICE: BIOLOGicAL FOUNDATiONS OF LAW (Roger D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); SARNoFF
A. MEDNICK ET AL., THE CAUSES OF CRum: NEw BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES (1997); ADRIAN
RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CTImu (1993); Michael T. McGuire, BiochemicalScreen-

ingto PredictBehavior,65 S. CAl. L. REv. 565 (1991).
For more popular reports on this research, see Pesticides and Aggression, RACHEL'S
ENV'T AN HEALTH WiEuxY No. 648 (Apr. 29, 1999); Wray Herbert, Politics of Biology: How
the Nature Vs. Nurture Debate Shapes Public Polic--and Our View of Ourselves, U.S. NEWs &
WoRua REP., Apr. 21, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 8331924.
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therefore, ever larger numbers of individuals could become directly
subject to possible criminal liability for violation of those statutes. Inasmuch as courts have widely divergent readings of the proper interpretation of the liability provisions of those statutes, wildly inconsistent results are not only possible but likely. Such a result would
severely compromise the integrity of and erode confidence in the environmental enforcement arm of the legal system.
Part II briefly concludes by considering the implications of the
Neurotoxicity Hypothesis for civil liability under federal environmental standards, and indicates the relevance of the interpretation of
civil standards for criminal environmental liability. Part I looks to
solutions, and will briefly outline ways in which U.S. laws-in particular federal criminal environmental laws-might be reformulated to
take account of the research undertaken in light of the Neurotoxicity
Hypothesis.
I. THE NEUROTOXicITY HYPOTHESIS
A. Introduction
On its face, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is elegant in its simplicity. The Neurotoxicity Hypothesis holds that biochemical imbalances
in heavy metals and other elemental toxins may contribute
significantly to anti-social behavior by disrupting the normal functioning of a person's brain biochemistry. In particular, research on the
Neurotoxicity Hypothesis has focused on uptake of lead, manganese,
cadmium and certain fluoride compounds.13 At the outset, however, it
is crucial to understand that the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is anything
13 See, e.g., Roger D. Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry and Social Status: The Neurotoxicity
Hypotlesis, in INTELLIGENCE, POLITICAL INEquAxLTY AND PUBIC POLICY 141 (1997) [here-

inafter Brain Biochemistry]; Roger D. Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry and the Violence Epideinic: Toward a "Win-Win" Strategy for Reducing Crime, in SUPER-OPrMnz9NG EXAMP._s
AcRoss PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS (Stuart Nagel ed., forthcoming); Roger D. Masters et al.,
EnvironmentalPollution,Neurotoxicity and CriminalViolence, inENvmoN.MrNrAL ToxicoLoGy:

Cuunu'rr DEVELOPMENTS 13 (1998) (reviewing evidence linking lead and manganese neurotoxicity to aggressive behavior and crime for all 3141 U.S. counties); TYI NE noTR.surrrER REVOLUTION: SEROTONIN, SocIAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAw

(Roger D. Masters &

Michael T. McGuire eds., 1993) [hereinafter Tim NEuxoTsRTmrrrzR

REVOLUTION];

Roger D. Masters, EnvironmentalPollution and Crime, 22 VT. L. REv. 359, 375 (1997) (arguing, inter alia, that "[b]oth crime prevention and effective sentencing need to consider a
broader range of risk factors than has hitherto been customary."); Roger D. Masters &
Myron Coplan, Water Treatment with Silicofluorides and Lead Toxicity, in INT'LJ. OF ENVTL.
STUDIEs (forthcoming 1999) (linking silicofluoride treatment of public water supplies with
increased childhood lead uptake in Massachusetts towns).
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but reductive. That is, it does not contend that exposure to heavy
metals single-handedly createscriminals. On the contrary, the hypothesis focuses on individual brain biochemistry, as influenced by both
individual genetic makeup and environmental exposure, as well as
other social conditions. 14 Consequently, a key aspect of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is the recognition that factors such as diet, alcohol,
and drug use play a role in permitting the speedier absorption of
heavy metals into an individual's system.1 5 In short, advocates of the
hypothesis stress that neurotoxicity should not be understood as the
determining variable for predicting violent behavior. Instead, they
make it clear that neurotoxicity is just one among many causes, "at
most functioning as a catalyst which, in addition to poverty, social
stress, alcohol or drug abuse, individual character, and other social
factors, increases the likelihood that an individual will commit a vio16
lent crime."
B. MeasuringNeurotoxicity
It is not the place of this Article to defend the science that undergirds the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, but it is necessary to explain
the basic premises underlying the hypothesis. Specifically, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis looks at two kinds of environmental toxicity: direct
and indirect. Direct toxicity refers to demonstrable exposure to a
toxic element, with detectable (and undesirable) consequences. An
example of direct toxicity would be childhood lead poisoning as a
consequence of ingesting lead paint, with resulting abnormal brain
development. 17 By contrast, indirect-or subclinical-toxicity looks,
for instance, at "[c]hanges in brain biochemistry that are not at first
obviously associated with environmental pollution [but] can have
significant effects on behavior."18 Thus, for example, exposure to subclinical levels of certain toxic elements might disrupt normal neurotransmitter function. 19 The neurotransmitters serotonin and dopa14

See Masters et al., BrainBiochemistry, supra note 13, at 154.

1-5
Seeid. at 156.
16
Masters et al., EnvironmentalPollution, Neurotoxicity and Criminal Violence, supra note

13, at17 18.

Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 154.
See Masters et al.,

18

d. at 155.

19"Neurotransmitters may be defined as chemical messengers, which allow the trans-

fer of information between neurons.... The neurotransmitters are of different types of
molecules, including amino acids, neuropeptides, and the biogenic amines." Dan J. Stein
& Michael Stanley, Serotonin and Suicide, in ThE NEURoTRAsm-riE REvomrrTON, supra
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mine are essential to "impulse control and planning."20 Evidence suggests that neurotoxic metals (notably manganese) can lower levels of
these key neurotransmitters, 21 thereby making it possible for an individual's neurotoxic exposure to result in violent activity.
The hypothesis concludes "that ecological factors such as environmental pollution have effects that appear to be genetic (and, indeed, may be associated with a genetically based vulnerability to toxicity that is quite distinct from a gene for intelligence)."22 This might
mean, for example, that twin children exposed to the same levels of
environmental toxins from birth might be differently affected by that
exposure, depending on their individual genetic makeup. 23 This aspect of the hypothesis has raised concern regarding its potential use
to support eugenic ends. Critics of this sort of research might contend, for example, that identification of a "gene" for toxicity vulnerability could be used to justify discrimination against such persons (or
worse) if it was also shown that individuals with that vulnerability were
more likely than others to commit violent crimes. 24 This criticism is of
note 13. See also Arthur Ytrwiler et al., The Basics of Serotonin Neurochemishy, in THE NEumoFRANSMrrrit REVOLLuTIoN, supranote 13, at 37-46.
2
0 Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supranote 13, at 154.
21 See id. at 153-54.
22
dat 152.
23 This is the thrust of some of the unpublished work of William Walsh, of the Health
Research Institute of Napierville, Illinois. Walsh conducted a study of twenty-four pairs of
twins where one twin was either not violent or less violent than an extremely violent twin.
The study revealed that the more violent twin had abnormal levels of trace heavy metals.
Telephone Interview with William Walsh, Ph.D., Health Research Institute (June 1, 1998).
Walsh's Institute is dedicated to correcting behavioral disorders through biochemical
means. See, eg., WilliamJ. Walsh et al., Elevated Blood Copper/Zinc Ratios in Assaultive Young
Males, 62 PiYSIOLOGY & BEHAviOR 327 (1997); William J. Walsh, Biochemical Treatment
and Behavior Outcomes (Aug. 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); WilliamJ. Walsh, Biochemical Treatment of Mental Illness and Behavior Disorders, Address at
the Minnesota Brain Bio Association (Nov. 17, 1997); William J. Walsh et al., Biochemical
Treatment of Behavior Disorders (May 9, 1996) (unpublished materials presented at the
149th Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, New York, New York, on
file with author); William J. Walsh, Zinc Deficiency, Metal Metabolism, and Behavior Disorders (Sept. 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see alsoH. Ron Isaacson
et al., Autism: A Retrospective Outcome Study of Nutrient Therapy, 48J. OF APPlIED NuTRmON
No. 4 (1996) (describing the use of nutrient therapy to treat behavioral and learning disorders, depression, schizophrenia, and autism); Nutrition:A Deficiency Made Me Do 14 30
PsYcuoL TODAY 14,14 (Nov./Dec. 1997).
24 See Sheldon M. Novick, RacialImages of the "Criminal:A Cognitive Disorder,22 VT. L.
REv. 383 (1997) (questioning the underlying assumptions and implications of the work of,
inter alia, Deborah Denno and Roger Masters); Joan Vogel, Biological Theories of Human
Behavior:Admonitionsofa Skeptic, 22 VT. L. REv. 425, 425 n.1 (1997) (citing extensive literature on "the uses and misuses of biological theories"). But see D.NNo, BIOLOGY AND VioLENCE, supra note 10, at 1-2 (noting the concern that biological explanations of behavior
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special concern in light of neurotoxicity research suggesting that
some racial and ethnic groups may, because of their diet and raciallylinked characteristics, be more vulnerable than others to environmental toxins. 25 The response of neurotoxicity researchers is that
these differences highlight the need to act in light of evidence of neurotoxic contamination. 26 Nonetheless, the concern that this will lead
to profiling of particular social groups-and above all racial
as the relevance of this reprofiling-is sure to remain a flashpoint
27
search continues to be debated.

will fuel prejudices, but emphasizing that such criticisms are reductive); but see generally
Roger D. Masters, Is Sociobiology Reactionary? The PoliticalImplications of Inclusive-Fitness Theoy, 57 Q. REv. BIOLOGY 275 (1982) (concluding that biological explanations are not necessarily ideological in content). For a survey of some recent literature considering the
kinds of racial disparities discussed by Novick, see Nicholas Lemann,JusticeforBlacks?, N.Y.
REv. Boom 25 (Mar. 5, 1998).
The typical concern raised in this context is that neurotoxicity research could be used
to manage populations in pernicious ways, as in the infamous case of Buck u Bell, involving
Carrie Buck, a "feeble-minded white woman," whose mother and child were also "feebleminded." See 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927). The State of Virginia sought to sterilize Buck under
a state statute. See id.Justice Holmes, declaring that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough," agreed with the State, and offered the following, chilling words in support of his
view.

[w] e have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to
be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
Id. at 207.
For a general overview of the social implications of new work in genetics, see generally TROY DusrTE,

BACKDOOR TO EuGmNcs (1990). See also generally JARED DiAmoND,

GuNs, GERms, AND STEEL: T1m FATES OF HuAN SocirTEs (1997). Among other things,
Diamond looks at the way historical incidents have affected the development of different
races and geographic regions. As such, Diamond's argument could be viewed as an endorsement of research like that on the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis to anticipate harms by
using the most recent advances in human knowledge. See generally id.
25 Masters, for example, notes that "all individuals are not equally vulnerable to ecological pathways of toxins." Masters et al., EnvironmentalPollution, Neurotoxicity and Criminal
Violence, supranote 13, at 31. He goes on to explain that the poor in the United States often suffer from dietary deficiencies, including vitamin D and calcium deficiencies. See id.
He explains that these deficiencies are made worse when an individual also suffers from
manganese exposure, because calcium can help reduce uptake of neurotoxic metals. See id.
26 See Masters et al., BrainBiochemistry, supranote 13, at 150-54.
27 On the concern with racial profiling as a result of this research, see, for example,
Novick, supra note 24, at 390 (arguing that even the focus on "violent crime" is a social
construction borne of inherently prejudicial racial stereotypes).
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Assuming that the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis correctly identifies a
contributing factor to criminal behavior, it begs the question of solutions. In this respect, advocates of the hypothesis stress that potential
solutions are relatively simple and inexpensive compared to the costs
of other forms of criminal enforcement, such as incarceration. Neurotoxicity researchers conclude, for example, that health and nutrition
are key in preventing violent, anti-social behavior. For instance,
"[d]ietary deficiencies, especially in calcium and other basic vitamins
and minerals, can be overcome," possibly correcting the anti-social
28
behavior caused by exposure to toxic elements.
'To be plausible, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis requires the
identification of precise biochemical mechanisms underlying correlations between individual concentrations of toxic metals and violent
behavior."2 9 To date, neurotoxicity research has focused on the dangers presented by four toxic heavy metals in particular. Before exploring the legal implications of the hypothesis, it is useful to review the
elemental toxins on which this research has concentrated °
1. Lead
The knowledge of the toxicity of elemental lead is ancient and
well-documented. 31 Despite the fact that lead reduction must be recognized as one of this country's greatest environmental regulatory
successes,3 2 the presence of lead in water (from deteriorating plumbing), urban soil, and the wall paint of aging housing stock has not disappeared. 3 Much of the research on lead poisoning, however, has
23

Masters et al., BrainBiochemistry, supranote 13, at 156 (noting that "[a]lthough some
researchers argue that the behavioral consequences of toxic elements are reversible with
individualized vitamin treatments, others have been critical of the research to
date."(citations omitted)).
29
Id. (citations omitted).
soSee id.
31"Concern over the effect of lead on infhnt and child development is, of course, of
long standing. Noted in antiquity by Hippocrates and two centuries ago by Benjamin
Franklin, the danger of lead poisoning has been the subject of widespread scientific analysis," Id. at 157.
32See, e.g., Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-4826 (1999); 15
U.S.C. §§ 2681-2692 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 4831 (1999).
35 See Lead Exposure Reduction Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2681-2692 (1999); Residential LeadIased Paint Poisoning Prevention Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4851-4856 (1999); Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247b-1, 300j-21-300j-26 (1999); see generally
Committee on Environmental Hazards, Statement on ChildhoodLead Poisoning,79JAMA 457
(Mar. 1987). The dangers of lead continue to merit study and regulation. See, e.g., Management and Disposal of Lead-based Paint Debris, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,190 (Dec. 18, 1998) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 745); Notice of the Revised P~iorityList of HazardousSubstances That
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focused on its adverse effects on the entire body-particularly on
nervous system damage4---and not on brain lead levels in particular.
Even at so-called subclinical levels, neurotoxicity research suggests,
lead can have serious adverse consequences as a cause of violent behavior.3 5 Of particular seriousness is the fact that infants and children
absorb lead at much higher levels than do adults, causing "neuronal
damage during early development, resulting in lasting cognitive and
behavioral deficits associated with prolonged exposure to even very
low doses."36 Moreover, "[t]he highest levels of lead uptake are reported for males and blacks-i.e. those who are most likely to commit
37
violent crimes."
Will be the Subject of Toxicological Profiles, 63 Fed. Reg. 61,332 (Nov. 17, 1997) ('This announcement provides notice that the agencies have developed and are making available a

revised CERCIA Priority List of 275 Hazardous Substances, based on the most recent information available to ATSDR and EPA."). Among the top twenty-five substances listed on
the 1997 Priority List of Hazardous Substances, lead placed second while cadmium placed
seventh. See 63 Fed. Reg. 70,190. See also, Herbert L. Needleman M.D. et al., Bone Lead Levels and DelinquentBehavior, 275 JAMA 363 (1996) (studying 850 boys ages seven to eleven
and concluding that lead exposure increases the risk of antisocial and delinquent behavior). But see Letter from Henrietta K. Sachs, M.D., to the Editor, Journal of the American
Medical Association,275JAMA 1725 (June 12,1996) (challenging Dr. Needleman's results);
Steve La Rue, Lead PoisoningContinues to Plague Kids, SAN DiEzo UIoN-T in., July 18,
1999, at BI (noting continuing exposure to lead in various forms, including, inter alia,
house paint, particularly among Hispanic- and African-Americans); Andrea MandelCampbell, Mexico Spotlight on Lead-ProducingCompanies, FiX. TnMS, Aug. 21, 1999, at 4;
John O'Neil, Study FindsLead Poisoningis Tied to Children's Tooth Decay, N.Y. TinEs, June 23,
1999, at A14.
m See Committee on Environmental Hazards, supra note 33, at 459 (noting that
"[n]europsychologic dysfunction, characterized by reduction in intelligence and alteration
in behavior, has been shown conclusively to occur in asymptomatic children with elevated
blood lead levels."). The report also noted that because of increased concerns in 1987
about the seriousness of excessive blood lead contamination, an Advisory Committee to
the Centers for Disease Control determined that the level for excessive blood lead should
be reduced by nearly twenty percent. See id.
35 See generallyMasters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supranote 13, at 153 ("It has long been
known that serious behavioral and cognitive deficits are caused by exposure to lead, especially during infancy and childhood. Subclinical lead poisoning has been correlated with
learning disabilities, Attention Deficit Disorder, and other psychological abnormalities
sometimes associated with deviant behavior."); Stein & Stanley, Serotonin and Suicide, supra
note 19; Yuwiler et al., The Basics of Serotonin Neurochemistry,supranote 19.
5 Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supranote 13, at 157.
37 R (citing Debra Brody et al., Blood Lead Levels in the U.S. Population,272 JAMA 27783 (1994); Derik Bryce-Smith, Lead Induced Disorderof Mentation in Children, 1 NuTRImTON &
HEALTH 179-94 (1983); Howard W. Mielke, Lead Dust-ContaminatedCommunities and Minority Health, A New Paradigm, in THE NATIONAL MINORTY HEALTH CONFERENCE (1992)). It
might have been more appropriate for Professor Masters and his co-authors to say that
young black men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five are more likely to be "arrested" for criminal activities than to "commit" them. Many argue that certain demo-
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2. Manganese
Manganese, the metal alloyed with steel to give it toughness and
durability, can "produce highly complex toxic effects" such as lowering the brain levels of neurotransmitters essential to behavior control,
such as serotonin, norepinephrine, and dopamine38 Because "abnormal levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin are associated with
mood disturbances, poor impulse control, and increases in aggressive
behavior ...it has been hypothesized that manganese uptake in the
brain lowers the levels or activity of dopamine and serotonin, leading
to loss of impulse control, violence, and even heart disease." 39
3. Other Neurotoxic Metals
Insofar as scientists have documented the possibility that heavy
metals like lead and manganese may disturb brain function, it seems
likely that "hitherto unsuspected toxins may act in addition to or in
combination with lead and manganese."4° Of special concern are
elements that may be associated with violent behavior, notably chromium, cadmium, and sodium. 41 Neurotoxicity research has not yet
focused on the possible contributions of these elements to violent begraphic groups, particularly young African-American men, commit more crimes per capita
or are more likely to be arrested because of their skin color. For example, one criminal
justice reform group has documented the fact that nearly one in three African-American
males between die ages of twenty and twenty-nine is, on any given day, in prison or jail, or
on probation or parole. The report questions whether that high percentage truly reflects a
need to punish instead of a practice of targeting specific groups. See generallyThe Sentencing Project, Report Summary, YouNG

B IA

AmxmAcs & TBx CRnmAxLJusncE SysTM:

FIVE YEARs LAmT (1995). Of course, if some demographic groups are arrested disproportionately as compared to those who actually commit crimes, it would be necessary for neurotoxicity research to take account of that fact, in part for some of the critical judgments
leveled against neurotoxicity research by Novick. See generallyNovick, supranote 24.
38 SeeMasters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 158.
39Id. As noted above, an especially important feature of neurotoxicity research is the
contention that contamination from heavy metals can only be understood in connection
with other empirical data. For instance, bottle-fed infants and those with diets low in calcium and essential vitamins appear to be "especially susceptible" to manganese uptake.
Notably, African-American and Latino-American infants are more likely than other infants
to be bottle-fed. What is more, the black and Latino poor appear to consume far less calcium and Vitamin D,which plays a central function in calcium uptake, than do whites. For
example, African-American teenage males consume on average about two-thirds of the
calcium of their white counterparts. See id. at 165. Once again, then, the Neurotoxicity
Hypothesis points to the conclusion that certain demographic groups may, as a result of
genetic predisposition, exposure to toxic heavy metals, and other factors like inadequate
nutrition, be more likely to commit violent criminal acts.
40
Id.
at
41

159.
See id.
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havior. However, neurotoxicity researchers have noted that the likely
role of these elements needs to be pursued, especially in light of the
strong correlations between lead and manganese and violent behavior.42
4. Other Potentially Toxic Elements
Recent neurotoxicity research points to an important "interven4
ing variable" in lead uptake, namely chemical fluoridation agents. 3
Specifically, "[e]levated levels of lead in water supplies are associated
principally with systems that introduced the use of [the fluoridation
agent] fluorosilicic acid after 1975, indicating that fluoridation procedures are probably a key factor" in lead uptake. 44 Preliminary research looked at 350 Massachusetts communities, some of which used
a fluoridation agent and some of which did not. In those communities
that treated water with fluorosilicic acid, the lead levels were nearly
double those of unfluoridated communities.45 As the research notes,
this suggests a hitherto unsuspected possible cause of lead neurotoxicity.46 Once further established, this research will demand legal action.
To the extent that the safety of water supplies are concerned, legal
action will include amendment of environmental laws and regulatory
standards. 47 For purposes of this Article, this research need not be
42 See generally Needleman et al., supranote 33; Walsh et al., Elevated Blood Copper/Zinc
Ratios in Assaultive Young Males, supra note 23; Walsh, Biochemical Treatment and Behavior
Outcomes, supra note 23; Walsh, Biochemical Treatment of Mental Illness and Behavior
Disorders, supranote 23; Walsh et al., Biochemical Treatment of Behavior Disorders, supra
note 23; Walsh, Zinc Deficiency, Metal Metabolism, and Behavior Disorders, supranote 23.
43 See generally Roger D. Masters & Myron D. Coplan, Public Water Supplies and Lead
Toxicity: The Role of Silicofluoridation Agents (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author); Roger D. Masters & Myron D. Coplan, The Triune Brain, the Environment,
and Human Behavior: Homage to Paul MacLean (July 16, 1999) (paper presented at Festschrift in Honor of Paul MacLean, on file with author).
44 Masters & Coplan, Public Water Supplies and Lead Toxicity, supra note 43; see Masters & Coplan, The Triune Brain, the Environment, and Human Behavior, supra note 43.
45 See Masters &cCoplan, Public Water Supplies and Lead Toxicity, supra note 43, at 6-

7.
46 Seeid. at 10.
47 For example, the recent decision of the City of Los Angeles to fluoridate its public

water supplies might have to be reversed. See Patrick McGreevy, Contract Clears Way for
Fluoridation, LA Tnms, Jan. 20, 1999, at B7. The research on the neurotoxicity of
silicofluorides has not yet documented possible correlations between those cities treating
with the potentially harmful fluoridation agents, namely fluorosilicic acid or sodium chloride, although the researchers did note "in [this] context that more than a dozen large
crime cities have been treating their water with these agents for between 20 and 40 years."
Masters & Coplan, Public Water Supplies and Lead Toxicity, supranote 43, at 10.
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conclusively proven. Rather, it points to a rapidly evolving body of
work that, as demonstrated in the remainder of this Article, will demand legal attention.
C. Related Concerns
As stressed above, a key aspect of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is
the multi-causal character of influences on violent behavior. Neurotoxicity researchers stress the interaction of several other factors along
with toxic exposure. The most notable of these are "[d]ietary deficits
in calcium, zinc, and essential vitamins or minerals [that] can result in
greater absorption of lead, manganese, and other toxic metals from
water supplies or food and uptake of such neurotoxic elements in
brain cells." 8 Of particular importance in this connection may be the
comparative infrequency of breast feeding among the urban poor.
Studies indicate that black children are three times less likely than
white children to be breast rather than bottle fed.4 9 Moreover, "National Nutritional Surveys show that black teenage males consume on
average only two-thirds as much calcium as do whites; calcium intake
among Hispanics was also below the white average." 50 Problems of
calcium delivery are not limited only to teenagers, however. Hispanic
and African-American infants are more likely to be bottle- than breastfed, and "[i]nfants bottle-fed with cows' milk formula absorb five
times more manganese than those who are breast-fed."-5 In addition,
infant formula is often mixed using water from pipes in aging water
systems that "transmit lead and manganese, further increasing the
risks."5 2 Thus, black and Hispanic children may be more likely to suffer neurotoxic poisoning-and therefore may be more inclined to
commit violent crimes later in life-because their diets are comparatively low in calcium.
For lawyers, this is important but complicating information. The
information makes the lawyers' task more difficult because it requires
environmental policies to be formed in the context of a broad appreciation of public health and welfare strategies-that is, devising ways
to combat potential environmental risks with comprehensive diet and
health planning. Similarly, neurotoxicity research suggests that alcoMasters et al., EnvironmentalPollution,supranote 13, at 19-20.
SeeMasters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supranote 13, at 166.
50Id. at 164, 166 (citations omitted).
5
1 Id.
at 160.
5
2Id.
48

49
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hol and drug use, both of which are "highly correlated with loss of
impulse control and violence," may increase "the cellular uptake of
cadmium, another of the toxic metals implicated in behavior dysfunction and violence." 3 Again, therefore, the optimal legal response
would be one that coordinated environmental and public health policy, combatting toxic heavy metal exposure simultaneously with the
implementation of strategies to reduce alcohol and drug consumption.
D. The ConnectionBetween Neurotoxic Contaminationand Crime
To test the plausibility of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, Roger
Masters, a Professor of Political Science at Dartmouth College, engaged with his research assistants in an exhaustive comparison of fed54
eral data on the distribution of environmental pollutants and crime.
First, Masters used the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) for 1991.55 He focused particularly on
lead and manganese exposure for all 3,141 U.S. counties. Masters
then looked at Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) crime reports
for those counties to measure the incidence of property and violent
56
crimes against the TRI lead and manganese exposure data.
Masters' findings are highly suggestive of a likely crimeenvironmental contamination link. First, he noted that eighty percent
of U.S. counties have no reported release of either compound.5 7 In

53 1d. at 159.
54 See Masters et al., EnvironmentalPollution,supra note 13, at 15-16, 32.
m See id. at 16, 32. The TRI is produced annually by the EPA pursuant to Section 313 of
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, and Section 6607 of
the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11023, 13106 (1999). The 1997 TRI,
the most recent, was published in April 1999. See Office of Pollution Prevention and
Toxics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1997 Toxics Release Inventory Public Data
Release Repor4 availableat http://www.epa.gov/optintr/tri/tri97/drhome.html.
-%See Masters et al., EnvironmentalPollution, supra note 13, at 16. The 242 counties reporting no incidence of violent or property crimes in that year were dropped from Masters's comparison. See id at 32.
One possible concern about the use of FBI data is that they may reflect, to a disproportionate degree, a bias from large urban centers, which may contain relatively more
efficient information-collection systems. Local crime reports may therefore present a more
reliable statistical base, although they are not easily obtained and such data might be
difficult to standardize.
57See id. It bears mentioning that Masters and his research colleagues also looked at
levels of alcoholism as they may have related to violent crime. Suffice it to say that they also
found a correlation between crime and alcoholism, a connection that is already a wellestablished feature of the criminology literature. See Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra
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those counties with no reported lead or manganese releases, "rates of
violent crime are below average (216 per 100,000 compared to the
national mean of 298)."58 Second, by contrast, "the 52 counties with
toxic releases from both metals ... have almost four times as much
violent crime (920 per 100,000)."59
Clearly, such powerful correlations demand attention. Yet from
the perspective of many scientists, trained in the methods of controlled clinical studies and multiple attempts to replicate the same
results, such correlations are inherently suspect. The concern is that
such correlations are subject to the "ecological fallacy," that is, the notion that one should be wary of turning correlations into causes. 60
Proponents of the hypothesis do not discount the possible relevance
of the ecological fallacy, but insist that it cannot be used as a means to
forestall serious consideration of their data. Inevitably, they argue, it is
simply impossible to control for every conceivable variable. It would
be unethical (if not practically impossible) to have a control group
that was exposed to toxic contamination in order to test the reliability
of the findings. 61 It is possible, however, to imagine forms of control
to demonstrate that Masters' correlations are indeed causes. 62
To correct for the possible relevance of the ecological fallacy,
proponents of the hypothesis argue, it is essential constantly to anticinote 13, at 159. This Article avoids discussion of that issue since its focus is on environmental law and policy and not on each of the variables.
5
8 Masters et al., BrainBiochemistry, supranote 13, at 159
69 Masters et al., EnvironmentalPollution,supra note 13, at 32.
0o Concern about the ecological fallacy should be especially heightened among lawyers, in light of several well-publicized misuses of scientific data. See generally MARciA ANCELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: ThE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW iN THE BREAST

IWPLANT CASE (1996). Angell discusses the ecological fallacy-without using the term of
art. See id. at 98.

61 "Although epidemiologists are increasingly aware of such synergistic interactions,
most conventional models of violent crime have looked at individual variables rather than
complex effects of ecological and lifestyle factors on brain chemistry and behavior." Masters et
al., EnvironmentalPollution,supranote 13, at 32.
62

Possibilities suggested by Michael McGuire, a professor of psychiatry and biobehav-

ioral science at the University of California at Los Angeles, would be longitudinal studies
or animal studies on non-human primates. Telephone Interview with Professor Michael

McGuire, UCLA (June 3,1998). Diana Fishbein, a criminologist and psychobiologist at the
University of Maryland, offered that human control groups might be formed where the
head hair of subjects was tested for possible toxic contamination, or to perform blood
assays on a subject population. Telephone Interview with Diana Fishbein, Criminologist/Psychobiologist, University of Maryland (Mar. 25, 1998). Adrian Raine, a professor of

clinical neuroscience, observed that this "Very exciting [neurotoxicity] research" next
needs "experimental intervention studies" to test the credibility of the findings. Telephone
Interview with Professor Adrian Raine (Feb. 10, 1998) (notes on file with author).
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pate potential problems with the data. To this end, Masters and his
team further scrutinized their data, noting that "[t]he correlations
between environmental pollution and crime interact significantly with
population density."63 Thus, for example, the researchers found that
in densely-populated counties with lead and manganese pollution,
there were "970 violent crimes per 100,000, or three times the national average, while the four low density counties with similar neurotoxicity have only 138 violent crimes per 100,000."6 The evidence is
highly suggestive that the "stress involved in urban living has neurochemical correlates that exacerbate the effects of neurotoxicity."5 In
short, toxic pollution seems likely to constitute a previously unsuspected risk factor that contributes, perhaps significantly, to geographic differences in violence. As Masters and his colleagues therefore conclude, their findings indicate that "urbanism, ethnicity and
toxicity emerge as important correlates of violent crime." 66 As a result,
"the traditional approaches to crime in the United States need to be
67
reconsidered from an ecological point of view."
For Masters and his group, political scientists and neuroscientists
by training, there are at least four important policy implications of the
Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. Subject to further empirical confirmation,
for example, they have suggested that, first, proof of the Neurotoxicity
Hypothesis will result in increasedindividual responsibility for criminal
behavior.68 That is, if we can reliably identify an individual's biochemical susceptibility to impulsive behavior, it will be possible to hold an
individual personally responsible for failing to take steps to control his
behavior.69 Second, they project that improved educational performance will be possible as a result once the hypothesis is more conclusively proven and widely accepted. Because "[tihe link between dietary deficiency, neurotoxicity and violence has also been associated
with low I.Q. and learning disabilities ...

nutritional components of

Head Start, school lunch programs, and food stamps may be of great
importance, provided they are monitored for necessary vitamins and

6 Masters et al., EnvironmentalPollution, supranote 13, at 33.
64
65

rd.

Id.
66 Id at 37.
67

1d

For example, it may be important to correct calcium deficiencies, since calium is
key to blocking uptake of manganese. See Masters et al., BrainBiochemistry, supra note 13, at
172-73.
69
See id.
at 171.
6
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minerals."7 0 Third, Masters and his colleagues are hopeful that further
proof of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis will have economic benefits in
the form of vitamin supplementation that, in the long term, would be
far less costly than incarceration as a means of rehabilitating violent
criminals. 71 Fourth and finally, they speculate that proof that "violence
is associated with abnormal brain biochemistry" will help screen violent criminals for biochemical imbalances and, thus, lead to further
improvements in the administration of criminal justice. 72 Masters and
his collaborators are quick to note, however, that improving criminal
justice administration should not become a means to react in an
overly-punitive manner, adding that "it is also essential to consider the
ethical and legal implications of our approaches to criminal vio7
lence.1
1. Individual Criminal Liability
Despite this admonition, Masters and his associates steadfastly
maintain that, no matter how strong the connection between neurotoxic contamination and crime revealed by their research, the principle of rmens rea should not be abandoned. 74 Masters, in fact, believes
that neurotoxicity data may heighten rather than diminish individual
responsibility, since the effects of the contamination can be controlled
to some extent through measures such as an improved diet.75 That a
researcher documenting the likely influence of what are typically
classified as "external" causes of crime should hew to the principle of
mens rea, which typically looks to choices within an individual's control, is a noteworthy feature of his research. In particular, if it is true
that, as Masters' research suggests, poorer members of certain racial
minority groups are disproportionately affected by neurotoxic contamination, an unwavering insistence on the notion of mens rea could
70

Id. at 171-72.

71See id. at 172.
72d.

73 Masters et al., BrainBiochemistry, supranote 13, at 172.
74 See Masters, EnvironmentalPollution and Crine, supra note 13, at 359 & n.1 (citing
source which concludes that, in addition to being the locus of neurochemical processes,

the nature of the central nervous system is such that "moral and law abiding behavior
needs to be seen as a skill).
75See Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supranote 13, at 171 (noting that "some people
are particularly likely to engage in impulsive behavior after consuming alcohol or
drugs.... If such a vulnerability can be reliably identified, we can hold such individuals
responsible for avoiding alcoholic beverages and drugs, much as is now the case with repeat offenders for driving under the influence.").
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have volatile political implications. On one hand, the hypothesis
seems to present data that would be most welcome to the political left
since it offers an explanation for criminal action that focuses on
larger social explanations for crime, rather than on some individual
action. For example, evidence of neurotoxicity could become a new
form of individual criminal defense like involuntary intoxication,
76
which may result in acquittal for certain types of criminal offenses.
On the other hand, however, an insistence on the application of
mens rea-for the reasons mentioned above-also could provide grist
to a conservative view of criminal behavior since it focuses attention
back on the choice of the errant individual. That is, neurotoxicity
could be used to make even more likely a finding of criminal liability
for persons who failed to correct a toxic condition. A prosecutor thus
might argue that because a defendant had been identified as having
elevated blood lead and manganese levels, that individual was responsible to take steps to mitigate the effects of the contamination. If the
defendant had not taken steps to correct those known levels and still
committed a violent crime, neurotoxic contamination might be used
to underline a case arguing malicious or, at a minimum, reckless be77
havior.
2. Mens Rea and Criminal Liability for Environmental Discharges of
Toxic Substances
Strikingly, the discussion of mens rea and neurotoxicity has focused almost exclusively on the kinds of possibilities sketched out
above. That is, the discussion has concentrated on the mental state of
violent individuals whose behavior may have been caused in some
measure by exposure to neurotoxic heavy metals. Mens reaneeds to be
evaluated, however, with respect to any person whose behavior is implicated by neurotoxicity, including those responsible for discharges
of neurotoxic materials into the environment. This Article now turns,
therefore, to the question of the implications of neurotoxicity research for the understanding of mens rea as applied to the prosecution
of federal environmental crimes.
76

This refers, in particular, to general-intent offenses and offenses based upon Model
Penal Code (MPC) standards of liability. See, e.g., JosHuA DmsusL,
UNDERSTANDING
CammTAL LAW 305-07 (2d ed. 1995).
77

A major concern presented by such an argument is that such a prosecution would

proceed on the assumption that such a defendant, who is likely to be poor and marginal-

ized, would have the opportunity to learn about this research and any consequent obligations, and have the means to correct the problem.
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As the federal environmental crime example makes clear, insisting on the inviolability of mens rea is much easier said than done. Masters' insistence on not abandoning mens rea may be a way to ensure
that the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis be given more serious consideration by criminologists and politicians. 78 But the mere statement that
mens rea should not be abandoned glosses over a host of extremely
complicated questions. Mens rea is, famously, one of the most illdefined concepts in Anglo-American criminal law. Injustice Holmes'
oft-quoted view, "most of the difficulties as to the mens rea [are] due to
having no precise understanding [of] what the mens rea is."7 9 In particular, as discussed below, a uniform notion of mens rea has not been
consistently applied in cases of environmental crime, owing, at least in
part, to some apparent moral ambivalence about holding people
criminally liable for environmental harm. As explained in the next
section, inconsistent application of a mens rea standard is likely to be
exacerbated by the results of the neurotoxicity research described
above. This Article now turns, therefore, to some of the legal implications of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis-and above all, the implications
for criminal intent standards.
II.

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE NEUROTOXICITY
HYPOTHESIS

The principal statute to be examined in this section is the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, more popularly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), 8 0 although reference will also be made to two other
central environmental laws, namely the Clean Air Act (CAA), 81 and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).82 With
respect to the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, these statutes could prove
particularly important inasmuch as the majority of releases of toxic
heavy metals occur by air, water, or through improperly-handled hazardous waste. Therefore, consideration of the civil and criminal enforcement provisions of these statutes provides an excellent opportunity to assess the potential responsiveness of federal environmental
laws to the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis.
78 See Masters, EnvironmentalPollution and Crime, supranote 13, at 359.
79 1 HoLms-LAsxu LTrmEs: THBE CoPU SPOND.NCE OF MR. JusncE HOLMES AND
HAROLD J. LAsIa, 1916-1935, at 4-5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard University Press

1953).
60t Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1377
(West 1999).
7
7 7

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401- 6 1q (West 1999).
22Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (West 1999).
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This Section will begin by examining the criminal and civil enforcement sections of the CWA in light of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. This is crucially important because neurotoxicity research will
likely require the legal system to consider the mens rea of those who
create toxic contamination leading to violent, neurotoxic-influenced
behavior.
The CWA is a useful example for several reasons. First, waterborne exposures to heavy metals are not uncommon.8 3 Second, the
CWA is a fairly typical environmental statute in structure; the OWA is
supported by a complex regulatory apparatus and sets not only federal water quality standards but also many state standards through the
delegation process.8 4 Third, like other principal environmental statutes, the CWA provides for citizen suits.8 5 All of these characteristics
make it worth studying in view of the fact that wider publication of
neurotoxicity research likely will result in lawsuits marshaling neurotoxicity data in support of claims under federal and state environmental statutes. This may lead, in turn, to criminal prosecutions.
Fourth, the CWA traditionally has been enforced according to a best
available treatment (BAT) standards model,8 6 in contrast to the CAA's
airshed management model. As discussed below, these different models could affect the outcome of lawsuits brought using evidence of
neurotoxic contamination.8 7 Fifth, and perhaps most importantly in
the context of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, "[tlhe confrontation
over mens rea in the [United States] Supreme Court is instead most
likely to arise in a felony prosecution brought pursuant to the Clean
Water Act."88 Therefore, it is advisable to attempt to head off the possibility of such a confrontation sooner rather than later.
83 Seegenerally EmrmoNmENTAL DEFENSE FuND, LEGACY OF LEAD: AmERICA's CoNTiNuNG Ep Dnc OF CIDHOOD LEAD POISONING 19-20 (1990); NATURAL REsouRCEs DEFENSE CouNCIL, TnE LEAD CONTAMINATION CONTROL ACT: A STUDY IN NoN-CoMPLIANCE
(1991).
84 The delegation process is described in most standard environmental texts. Of
course, state common law is also an important environmental enforcement tool. See, e.g.,
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY

117-223 (2d ed. 1996).
8 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
8 BAT stands for "Best Available Technology Economically Achievable." OLGA L.
MoYA AND ANDREW L. FoNo, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE USER'S GUIDE 356
(West).
8
7 See infra Section M.AL
88
Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental CriminalLaw: Reading Supreme Court
Tea Leaves, 7 FoRDHHm ENVTL. LJ. 861, 879 (1996) (also citing the possibility of a liability
standard confrontation under either RCRA or the CAA).
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A. CriminalProvisionsofMajorFederalEnvironmental
Statutes
1. Clean Water Act
a. Statutory Scope
The most comprehensive criminal statutory scheme contained in
any major federal environmental law appears in the CWA. As with
many federal environmental laws, the CWA's principal criminal enforcement sections have a tripartite structure. First, the statute creates
penalties for negligent violations.8 9 Second, it penalizes knowing violations.90 Third, and finally, the CWA punishes knowing endangerment.91
In each case, these provisions focus on what a violator knew or
reasonably should have known. Thus, for example, negligent violation
of the CWA subjects a person to punishment, with fines of up to
$25,000 per day of violation, and/or imprisonment of up to one year
(with double penalties following first convictions under this subsection) when she either negligently violates the CWA' s national effluent
limitations, water quality, and treatment standards, or:
negligently introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly
owned treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which such person knew or reasonably should have
known could cause personal injury or property damage or,
other than in compliance with all applicable Federal, State,
or local requirements or permits, which causes such treatment works to violate any effluent limitation or condition in
any permit issued to the treatment works.92
The provision for "knowing" violations tracks the above-quoted language exactly, excepting that the first word above-"negligently'-becomes "knowingly. 9 3 The penalties for knowing violations, however,
are greater: up to $50,000 per day of violation and/or imprisonment
for up to three years. 94 Importantly, federal case law interpreting the
69 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1).
00 See id. § 1319(c) (2).
01See id. § 1319(c) (3). In addition, the OWA criminally punishes false statements, and
"treatment of single operational upset." Id. §§ 1319(c) (4), (5). This Article will not address
these provisions since they are relatively less important than the others.
t

2ld. § 1319(c) (1) (B).
0s See id. § 1319(c) (2).
94 See33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2).
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"knowing" standard has consistently provided that the requisite
knowledge needed to establish a violation is merely knowledge that
the materials discharged into waterways are dangerous, and not that
the discharge is illegal. 95 This is in keeping with the ambitious aims of
the statute, although commentators often point out that such a comparatively low threshold for a finding of criminal liability creates considerable enforceability problems.9 6
The knowing endangerment provision differs somewhat from the
previous two in that they concern actions that place "another person
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury," with fines of
"not more than $250,000 or imprisonment of not more than 15 years,
or both." 97 As with both negligent and knowing violations, violations
after first convictions are subject to double fines and terms of imprisonment. Additionally, this section addresses problems of proof for
purposes of determining whether an individual knowingly endangered the life or well-being of another. Circumstantial evidence that a
defendant affirmatively attempted to shield herself from knowledge of
potential harm may be submitted (although defendant has a statutory
affirmative defense to such evidence).98

95See generally United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997).
9 See, e.g., Lazarus, supranote 88, at 864-67; see also Section II. A..b, infra.
9733 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (3) (A). In each of the three statutes examined here, "serious
bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted
loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." Id.
§ 1319(c) (3) (B) (iv); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(f) (6),
7413(c) (5) (F) (West 1999).
98 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c) (3) (B). Section 1319(c) (3) (B) provides, in relevant part:
[I]n determining whether a defendant who is an individual knew that his
conduct placed another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury-(I) the person is responsible only for actual awareness or actual belief that he
possessed; and
(HI) knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant but not by
the defendant himself may not be attributed to the defendant;
Except that in proving the defendant's possession of actual knowledge,
circumstantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant
took affirmative steps to shield himself from relevant information.... [However] a defendant may establish an affirmative defense under this subparagraph by a preponderance of the evidence.
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Additional affirmative defenses to this section include explanations that "the person endangered and that the danger and conduct
charged were reasonably foreseeable hazards of... an occupation, a
business or a profession," or "medical treatment or medical or scientific experimentation." 99
b. Interpretationand the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis
In light of the neurotoxicity research described in Part I of this
Article, the issue presented by CWA's criminal liability standards is
simple; subject to scientific confirmation of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis (or similar neuroscientific research), EPA and/or state agencies will be compelled to lower the acceptable discharges of neurotoxic heavy metals into the environment. This, in turn, is sure to lead
to increased CWA criminal prosecutions, under each of the criminal
liability provisions described above. For example, under federal law,
lead and cadmium are currently classified as "toxic pollutants" subject
to national effluent discharge limitations under the CWA. 100 Once the
acceptable discharge thresholds are reduced, permit and other regulatory violations will be more prevalent, thereby expanding the field
of criminal prosecution under the CWA.101 As described in the previous subsection, most observers already consider a determination of
CWA criminal liability to be relatively easy.10 2 If, in addition, threshold
levels for discharge of toxic heavy metals into the environment are
dramatically lowered, criminal liability could become commonplace.
This, in turn, could further exacerbate the inconsistent application of
criminal liability provisions under federal environmental laws such as
the CWA. In no respect is this inconsistency clearer than in the case of
9Id.
100 See id § 1317(a) (authorizing EPA to publish a list of toxic pollutants subject to the
CWA); see also 40 C.F.RL § 401.15 (West 1999) (setting forth the -WA's list of toxic pollutants).
101 The kind of lawsuit envisioned here would be one using neurotoxicity data to
prosecute facts similar to those establishing criminal liability in United States -t Wells Metal
Finishing,Inc. See 922 F.2d 54,56 (1st Cir. 1991). In Wells, a metal finishing plant was found
to have released excess amounts of zinc and cyanide into a public sewer system, "vastly in
excess of federal pretreatment limits." Id. The appellate court refused to overturn defendant's conviction in light of convincing evidence that "[t]oo much zinc and cyanide could
kill beneficial microorganisms in the treatment plant and render its operations much less
efficient and therefore much more costly." Id. at 57. The First Circuit also noted that "excessive amounts of cyanide may mix with acidic sewer wastes to form highly lethal cyanide

gas." Id.

I02 See supranotes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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what is meant by the term "criminal intent" for purposes of an environmental crime.
i. The Problem of Criminal Intent
Simply put, courts are confused as to what constitutes criminal
intent for purposes of the federal environmental statutes. This confusion stems largely from disagreement as to whether common law
"general" and "specific" intent categories should be used, or whether
MPC categories should apply. This subsection will examine that confusion. Ultimately, the analysis indicates, the MPC standards are preferable because they employ a more objective test. No matter which set
of categories is used to analyze criminal intent, however, data like that
produced by the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis raises a serious possibility
of increased criminal liability for environmental violations.
Susan Mandiberg has made the case that it is necessary to define
a normative jurisprudence for environmental crimes in particular,
and many regulatory crimes more generally. 10 3 As Mandiberg notes, in
the regulatory crime context there is considerable "confusion about
mental state [that] results from the lack of a coherent jurisprudential
framework for federal regulatory crimes," a situation complicated by
the fact that "the Supreme Court has increasingly interpreted regulatory crimes by reference to the traditional common-law notion of mens
rea, which it treats as a normative concept."1 0 4 As Mandiberg further
explains, however, current analysis of federal regulatory crimes like
those identified in the principal environmental statutes, "is not yet
103
See generally Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Federal Regulatory
Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 ENvrL. L. 1165 (1995) [hereinafter The Dilemma of
Mental State]; Susan F Mandiberg, Moral Issues in Environmental Crime, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL.
LJ. 881 (1996). See also generallyKevin A. Gaynor et al., EnvironmentalCriminalProsecutions:
Simple Fixes for a Flawed System, 3 Vh.. Euv-.. LJ. 1, 4 (1992) (stating that "[gliven the
serious nature of the [environmental] crimes and penalties involved, the complexity of the
laws, and the broad applicability of the federal environmental laws to American society; a
higher level of culpability [than "knowing" violations] should be imposed, either as a matter of prosecutorial discretion or through statutory amendment."); Richard J. Lazarus,
AssimilatingEnvironmentalProtectionInto Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime,
27 Loy. L.A. L. Rxv. 867 (1994) [hereinafter AssimilatingEnvironmentalProtection];Richard
J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integrationin the Evolution of EnvironmentalLaw: Reforming
Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEo. LJ.2407 (1995) [hereinafter Meeting the Demands];
Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental CriminalLaw: Reading Supreme Court Tea Leaves, supra
note 88; Richard J. Lazarus, The Reality of Environmental Law in the Prosecution of Environmental Crimes: A Reply to the Department ofJustice, 83 Gzo. LJ.2539 (1995); LoisJ. Schiffer &
James F. Simon, The Reality of ProsecutingEnvironmental Criminals: A Response to Professor
Lazarus, 83 GEo. LJ. 2531 (1995).
104
Mandiberg, TheDilemma ofMental State, supra note 103, at 1167-68.

EnvironmentalAffairs

[Vol. 27.341

well suited to answering some of the thorny questions that regulatory
crime statutes present." 05 In particular, she notes the Supreme Court
has applied an analytical framework that, following a common law
paradigm, applies "specific intent" principles to some regulatory
crimes and "general intent" principles to others (notably to crimes
deemed "public welfare offenses").106

As Mandiberg argues, however, it is important to recognize that
the common law categories, which will be discussed more fully below,
have been applied in the prosecution of environmental crimes where
the meaning of the relevant statutory standards is unsettled with respect to the requisite mens rea.1o7 By contrast, Richard Lazarus has vigorously argued that the "nonintegration" of criminal law standards
and environmental law standards has created serious problems for the
long-term success and credibility of the federal model of criminal environmental law.108 Mandiberg's approach suggests, however, that the
"nonintegration" that Lazarus identifies may be less serious a problem
than it at first glance appears. Instead, her analysis suggests that although the application of common law mens rea standards to the
prosecution of federal statutory environmental crimes may have made
their enforcement confusing and inconsistent, it does not necessarily
indicate fundamentally different ways of thinking about environmental and criminal law enforcement.1 0 9
105

Id. at 1168.
See id.
at 1205-06.
107 See id. at 1177-79.
103 See Lazarus, Meeting the Demands, supra note 103, at 2412. Lazarus is not alone in
these concerns. See generally Michael Herz, Structures ofEnvironmental CriminalEnforcement; 7
FoRDHw ENvTL. L.J. 679 (1996) (examining differing enforcement priorities between the
Department ofJustice and the EPA).
109 See generallyMandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supra note 103. One respect in
which Lazarus may overstate his case is in his view of criminal law as essentially static, as
when he observes that one of the fundamental differences between criminal and environmental law is that "[criminal law emphasizes settled norms, while environmental law constantly changes and aspires for fundamental and dramatic change." Id. at 2445. See also
Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection, supra note 103, at 879-85. What Lazarus
clearly overlooks, however, is that criminal law can be equally dynamic and unsettled. Examples of this include the criminalization of activities like "date rape," "stalking," and others that were not traditionally viewed as criminal behavior. For an overview of the emergence of activities not previously subject to criminal prosecution, see Sanford Kadish, Fy/'y
Years of CiminalLaw: An OpinionatedReview, 87 CAT. L. Rxv. 943, 975-78 (1999) (discussing the impact of feminism on the criminal law). Notable examples include the decriminalization of consensual sodomy. See, e.g., LEsBrANs, GAY MNEN, ANm Tx LAW 87-88
(1993) (noting that "[a]s of 1961, all fifty states in the United States still had some sort of
sodomy laws on their books. Today, fewer than half the states do."(citation omitted)). A
more recent example is the effort to de-criminalize marijuana use for medical purposes.
10
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The application of common law principles to federal statutory
environmental crimes, in fact, may reflect a fundamental unwillingness to apply the existing, "knowing" statutory standards, standards
rooted in the conceptual reforms of the MPC." ° It may be that resistance to the application of the statutory standards does not stem from
a belief that environmental harms do not merit prosecution. Rather, it
is possible that the resistance is due to the broad reach of those standards or because environmental malefactors, unlike many common
law criminals, perform social services even as they commit acts for
which criminal liability should be assessed.11 '
In addition, the ambiguity of federal environmental statutes may
have forced courts to insert common law paradigms into the analysis
of statutory standards. For example, although the CWA punishes
"knowing" violations, it does not explain what a defendant is charged
with knowing. Thus, case law has focused to an exceptional degree on
questions such as whether a defendant charged with criminal liability
under the CWA knew merely whether the materials discharged in exSee, e.g., Ethan A. Nadelmann, New Approach to Drugs That's GroundedNot in IgnoranceorFear
But Common Sense, C-. TiuB., Oct. 10, 1999, at C23 (advocating decriminalization for
medical marijuana). But see Reno Opposes Medical MarijuanaInitiatives, The White House
Bull., Oct. 7, 1999 (stating official White House view against such efforts, "until or unless
scientists or medical experts find specific medicinal properties unique to marijuana")
(LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File).
no In fact, congressional amendment may be understood to reflect the MPC's conceptual clarifications. As the Eighth Circuit noted in UnitedStates u Sinske.
In 1987, Congress amended the act [33 U.S.C. Sec. 1319 (c) (2) (A)] in part to
increase deterrence by strengthening the criminal sanctions for its violation.
See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1104, at 138 (1986) and S. Rep. No. 99-50, at
29-30 (1985). To that end, Congress changed the term "willfilly" to "knowingly" in that section of the act dealing with intentional violations. See 133
Cong. Rec. H131 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987) (statement of Rep. J. Howard), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.CAN. 5, 28, and 33 U.S.C. § 1319, historical and statutory notes, 1987 amendment, at 197 (West Supp. 1997). Although Congress
did not explicitly discuss this change, it may logically be viewed as an effort to
reduce the mens rea necessary for a conviction, as the word "willfilly" generally connotes acting with the knowledge that one's conduct violates the law,
while the word "knowingly" normally means acting with an awareness of one's
actions.
119 F3d 712,716 (8th Cir. 1997).
Sanford Kadish recently called the promulgation of the MPC "It]he event of looming
significance this past half-century in the field of criminal law." SANuroRD KADxSH & STEPHN ScnmuHoarz, CRInmNAL LAw AND rrs PxocEsszs: CASES AND MRAus 946, 947-53
(5th ed. 1989).
II That is to say, for example, that while most would agree that the life-harming release of cadmium merits criminal conviction, few would support an end to manufacture of
long-life cadmium batteries.
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cess of permitted levels were toxic, or whether the discharge was un11 2
permitted.
Because neurotoxicity research is likely to force a drastic reduction of acceptable levels of toxic materials that may be discharged into
the environment, these problems in assessing federal environmental
criminal liability are likely to become even more acute. In short, neurotoxicity research suggests that pollution may have even more devastating health consequences than previously thought. This may open
the door to increased litigation. Moreover, whatever the nature of the
underlying differences, if any, between environmental and criminal
law, both Lazarus and Mandiberg agree that the analytical framework
used to establish mens rea under federal environmental statutes is un113
satisfactory.
The reasons for this deserve consideration as they bear directly
upon the potential challenges the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis presents
for enforcement of federal environmental crimes. A difference between many environmental and common law crimes is that, for most
statutory environmental crimes, a prosecutor is not required to prove
a number of different elements in order to establish environmental
criminal liability.11 4 However, this has not stopped courts-even the
Supreme Court-from attempting to impose a classical common law
mens rea framework onto the language of "knowing" environmental
crimes, like violations of the CWA. This is true even where, as with the
115
CWA, the statute is silent as to criminal intent.
In her examination of Supreme Court regulatory crimes jurisprudence, Mandiberg concludes that a two-part structure has been
developed "for interpreting mental state in ambiguous federal regulatory crime statutes."1 16 That structure, she concludes, closely tracks
common law crime distinctions.1 1 7
112

SeeSection IA., infra.

I's See Lazarus, Meeting theDemands, supranote 103, at 2412; Mandiberg, The Dilemma of

MentalState, supranote 103, at 1167-68.
14 See Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supranote 103, at 1170-76 (discussing

inconsistent approaches as to what might be proved to establish a scienter requirement
under RCRA and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994)).
1 See id. at 1201-02 (discussing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), a prosecution under the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 (1988)). Like the OWA,
the statute at issue in Staples did not speak to mental state ("[s]ilence on this point by itself
does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens
rea element"). See Staples, 511 U.S. at 605.

116 Mandiberg, supra note 103, at 1203.
117See id.at 1204-15.

20001

Neurotoxicity

Specifically, Mandiberg notes that the Court classifies some regulatory crimes as "public welfare offenses," using an analysis that closely
parallels the common law category of "general intent" crimes.11 8 A
general intent crime is one where culpability is "objectively assessed."11 9 That is to say, "'[g] eneral' intent can mean a number of
different things, but in this context it generally means that it is
sufficient to convict when the defendant did what in ordinary speech
we would call simply an intentional action."1 20 A specific intent crime
is one in which, by contrast, culpability "is subjectively assessed. The
prosecution must prove that the defendant engaged in the actions
'with some specified purpose in mind' or that the defendant was sub12 1
jectively aware 'of some specific circumstance.'"
For example, bigamy is a general intent crime, while burglary,
which requires a breaking and entering under cover of night with the
1 22
specific intent to commit a crime therein, is a specific intent crime. Without an intention to commit a crime such as theft therein, a defendant
would only be guilty of criminal trespass. This distinction, however, is
not one that lends itself to intellectual clarity. As Joshua Dressler
notes:
[t]he terms 'specific intent' and 'general intent' are the
bane of criminal law students and lawyers. This is because
the terms are critical to understanding various common law
rules of criminal responsibility, yet the concepts are so 'notoriously difficult... to define and apply ...[that] a number
of text writers recommend that they be abandoned alto-"
123
gether.
Nonetheless, Mandiberg observes that "general" and "specific
intent" crimes "parallel ...the Court's regulatory crime categories.... The 'public welfare offense' category is at least superficially
similar to 'general intent' in some striking ways," notably "conductcircumstance combinations that are so dangerous and uncommon
118 See id.

at 1206.
n9 Id.
0KADISH & ScHuJLHoFER, supra note 110, at 230.
l

Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supra note 103, at 1206 (citing, inter alia,

KADISH & Scisuuorm, supranote 110; DRESSLER, supra note 76, at 109-10).
122 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.25 (West 1999); CAL.PENAL CODE §§ 459-460

(West
1999).
1
w DRxssL.vx, supranote 76, at 118 (citations omitted) (ellipses and bracketed text in
the original). See iL at 102-03 (quoting various authorities on the ambiguity of the term
mens rea). See also supranote 67 and accompanying text.
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that everyone should know they are regulated." 124 She further explains that "[t]here are even more compelling parallels between 'innocent activity offenses' and 'specific intent' crimes." 125 To be exact,
"[iun traditional 'specific intent,' the defendant is subjectively aware
of a circumstance, goal, or motive that is immoral in the traditional
sense. This may also be true in 'innocent activity offenses' when the
'something extra' is the defendant's awareness of violating the law."1 26
In the context of criminal clean water violations, a public welfare offense that is comparable to the common law "general intent" category
would be any discharge of substances known to be toxic to humans, so
long as such discharge is "uncommon."127 By contrast, in the "innocent activity offense" context, a criminal clean water violation paralleling a common law "specific intent" crime might be the deliberate violation of a permitted discharge that had the effect of endangering the
public.
Mandiberg concludes her comparison by observing that the Supreme Court has developed what she identifies as a two-step protocol
for analyzing regulatory crimes. At a deep level, this protocol is informed by the common law of crimes and the "traditional normative
jurisprudence" that the common law reflects. Specifically, she argues:
[i]f the Court can say that the situation is physically dangerous and uncommon enough to cause widespread community
concern, the crime is a 'public welfare offense.' In those
cases, mens rea consists of the defendant's awareness of engaging in that conduct under those circumstances. For other
statutes, the crime is an 'innocent activity offense'; mens rea
therefore consists of the defendant's awareness of the conduct, the factual circumstances, and either the law or a
28
probable unlawful consequence.

124 Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State, supra note 103, at 1210. "Perhaps" Mandiberg muses, "'public welfare offenses' are the 'general intent' crimes of the modem era."
Id.
125 Id. at 1220.
126 Id.
127 Cf

United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971)
(transport of dangerous chemicals). As Mandiberg notes, the jurisprudential basis of the
"uncommon" requirement is unclear. Her observation is accepted for purposes of this
Article, although it merits further consideration. For a discussion of the requirement, see
Mandiberg,
The Dilemma ofMental State, supranote 103, at 1212-13.
128 Mandiberg, TheDilemma ofMental State, supranote 103, at 1215.
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These distinctions go to the heart of the difficulties courts and commentators have had with the assessment of criminal liability for environmental crimes. In no case is this contrast more clear than in United
129
States v. Weitzenhoff
Perhaps more than any other CWA criminal prosecution, Weitzenhoff has occasioned both stern disapproval and widespread celebration for its reading of the CWA's mens rea requirement.1 ° In Weitzenhoff, the managers of a sewage treatment plant on the Hawaiian island
of Oahu were found guilty of conspiring to discharge pollutants into
the ocean near a popular swimming and surfing beach.13 1 The case
presented an issue of first impression before a federal Court of Appeals, namely whether the district court was correct in "construing
'knowingly' in section 1319(c) (2) [of the GWA] as requiring only that
[defendants] were aware that they were discharging the pollutants in
question, not that they knew they were violating the terms of the statute or permit."13 2 The Court noted that "[a]s with certain other
criminal statutes that employ the term 'knowingly,' it is not apparent
from the face of the statute whether 'knowingly' means a knowing
violation of the law or simply knowing conduct that is violative of the
law."133 After reviewing the legislative history for section 1319 (c) (2),
the Court concluded that "congressional explanations of the new
penalty provisions strongly suggest that criminal sanctions are to be
imposed on an individual who knowingly engages in conduct that re19 Seegenerally 1 Ed 1523 (9thCir. 1993).
130 See, e.g., Kevin P. Cichetti, United States u Weitzenhoff. Reading out the "Knowingly"from
the "Knowingly riolates"inthe Clean WaterAc4 9 ADMIN. L.J. Ai. U. 1, 183 (1996); Richard G.
Cohn-Lee, Mens Rea and Permit Interpretation Under the Clean Water Act: United States v.
Weitzenhoff, 24 ENVTL. L. 1351, 1354-57 (1994) (arguing that Weitzenhoff correctly applied
the CWA as a "general intent" statute by placing the burden to resolve permit ambiguities
on the permittee); Katherine H. Setness, Statutory Interpretation of Clean Water Act Section
1319(c)(2)(A)'s Knowledge Requirement: Reconciling the Needs of Environmental and Criminal
Law, 23 EcoLoGY L.Q. 447,450 (1996) (criticizing Weitzenhoff's analysis) [hereinafter Statutory Interpretationof Clean Water Act Section 1319(c)(2)(A)s Knowledge Requirement]; Kepten D.
Carmichael, Note, Strict CiminalLiabilityfor Environmental Violations:A Need forJudicialRestrain 71 IND. Lj.729, 731, 748-52 (1996) (criticizing Weitenhoffs "public welfare" reading of the CWA as an example of defacto strict liability and its "intolerable implications" for
environmental regulatory violations); MichaelJ. Penders, Innocentsat Risk? The Rhetoric and
Reality of Environmental CriminalEnforcemen4 2 ENvm. L. 835, 841 (1996) (book review)
(discussing the Weitzenhoffcourt's interpretation of the CWA as a "public welfare" statute).
See generally Ruth Ann Wendell et al., Erosion of Mens Rea in Environmental CriminalProsecution, 21 SETON HALL L.REv. 1100 (1991).
13iSee 1 E3d at 1527-28 n.1.
1
321d at 1529.
1
33 Id. Curiously, the Ninth Circuit did not specify the "certain other criminal statutes"
to which it referred. See id.
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suits in a permit violation, regardless of whether the polluter is cognizant of the requirements or even the existence of the permit."134
Moreover, the Court made clear that in so reading the statutory language of the CWA's "knowing" violations, it viewed the CWA as a
135
"public welfare" statute.
Thus, to return to Mandiberg's explanatory scheme, in Weitzenhoff the Court understood the CWA's knowing violation provision

much as it would a "general intent" crime in the sense that defendants
intentionally authorized employees to discharge waste directly into
the ocean.1 3 6 The opinion further makes clear, however, that the
Court recognized the possible strength of an argument to the effect

that the provision is more like a "specific" than a "general intent"
crime. Specifically, the Court explicitly rejected defendant-appellants'
'RId.
135 The Wdtzenhoff court thus analogized the OWA to federal statutes concerning the
transport of corrosive liquids, management of hazardous wastes, drug shipments, and use
of firearms. The court thus cited, respectively, United States u InternationalMinerals & Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (dealing with the transport of corrosive liquids); United States u
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that knowledge of absence of a permit is not
required for a RCRA violation); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (construing
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); and United States &Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996 (9th CiAr.
1988) (stating that proof that defendant knew she/he was violating law was not required to
establish violation of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act). See Weitzenhoff, 1 3d at 1530.
These public welfare cases are sometimes called "strict criminal liability" offenses. For a
discussion of these cases, their history, and the development of criminal liability standards
in the environmental law context, see CmSTopmxR HARms ET Ar., ENvrRoNmENTAL
Cimums §§ 5.03-.06 (1992).
It is central to the argument advanced in this Article to recognize that this "public welfare" reading has been applied not only in the context of the CWA, but in cases involving
other federal environmental statutes as well. For instance, in the seminal RCRA case of
United States v.Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 E2d 662 (3d Ci. 1984), the Third Circuit considered whether RCRA's knowing violation section, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2) (A), "covers employees as well as owners and operators of a facility" that violated its RCRA permit. Johnson
& Towers, 741 F.2d at 664. Examining both the statutory language and RCRA's legislative
history, ie court held, however, that:
it is well established that criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to protect public health, in contrast to statutes based on common law crimes, are
to be construed to effectuate the regulatorypurpose... It would undercut the purposes of the legislation to limit the class of potential defendants to owners
and operators when others also bear responsibility for handling regulated
materials.
rd. at 665-66 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
Although Johnson & Towers is a RCRA case, the similar structure of the "knowing" language means that this point applies with equal force to other federal environmental criminal provisions like that of the CWA.
136 See 35 Ed 1275, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993).
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analogy to Liparota v. United States.137 In Liparota, the prosecution was
required to demonstrate that a violation of a federal statute proscribing the unauthorized use of food stamps required proof of the defendant's knowledge that he was violating the law.138 Unlike Liparota's
alleged abuse of food stamp regulations however, the Court in
Weitzenhoff insisted that knowledge of the law was immaterial for a
finding of liability: "[t]he criminal provisions of the CWA are clearly
designed to protect the public at large from the potentially dire consequences of water pollution ...

and as such fall within the category

of public welfare legislation." 139
The Weitzenhoff court's brief colloquy on the mental state required by the CWA (and, by extension, comparable environmental
statutes) goes to the heart of the discomfort many feel about finding
criminal fault for violations of environmental statutes. Richard Lazarus's concern is typical. Lazarus worries that, to the peril of the environmental cause, environmentalists have resisted "an argument in
favor of accommodating the basic rights of those who violate the
law-their right not to be incarcerated in the absence of violation of
certain traditional norms of moral culpability."14° Lazarus's criticism
sounds very much like a plea to transform the "general intent"-like
public welfare crimes into "specific intent" crimes:
Does criminal culpability turn on the defendant's awareness
of facts with the level of precision actually determinative of
the lawfulness of the defendant's activity? Courts have addressed this issue in a variety of environmental law contexts.
Their virtually uniform answer is that no such rigorous proof
of the defendant's knowledge is necessary-liability is not
entirely strict. Yet, given the breadth and depth of relevant
facts of which the government need not prove knowledge,
liability for knowing violations could be fairly dubbed mostly
strict (if such a characterization is not an oxymoron).141

See id.; see generally471 U.S. 419 (1985).
In See Liparota,471 U.S. at 433.
1s9 Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d at 1530 (citations to legislative history omitted).
140
13

Lazarus, Meeting the Demands, supra note 103, at 2529. But see Schiffer &Simon, supra note 103, at 2532; cf. Lazarus, The Reality of EnvironmentalLaw in the Prosecutionof Environmental Cimes,supranote 103, at 2541-43.
141Lazarus,

Meeting the Demands, supra note 103, at 2472. For Lazarus's critique of the

application of the public welfare doctrine, see id. at 2472-84.
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Lazarus's analysis may be faulted for failing to focus on the distinction
between "general" and "specific intent" crimes, which is to say that
what he sees as a flaw in the intent standards applied to environmental crimes may in fact reflect an interpretive choice with which he
disagrees. Nonetheless, Lazarus is certainly not alone in his view, and
the chorus of agreement with him in this respect makes clear that a
formal reevaluation of criminal environmental intent standards is
long overdue. 14
ii. Standards of Intent and the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis
What do standards of intent have to do with the powerful correlations between violent criminal behavior and environmental toxins
suggested by the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis? Above all, this Article
suggests that the kind of data currently being produced in support of
the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis could well push the controversy regarding the required mental state in federal environmental criminal
prosecutions to the breaking point. That is, lawsuits for criminal liability based on neurotoxicity data can only sharpen the concerns addressed in a case like Weitzenhoff as to the appropriate scope of criminal liability for environmental harms. Whether using a "general"- or a
"specific intent-like standard, neurotoxicity seems likely to produce
even louder calls for clarification of the appropriate liability standard.
The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, studies documenting the likely role of neurotoxic contamination as a significant
co-factor contributing to violent criminal behavior are likely to increase the pressure to apply a "general intent"-like standard, as is
presently the case with interpretation of the CWA as a "public welfare"
statute. On the other hand, it is equally true that Lazarus' and related
concerns will, in light of neurotoxicity data, result in ever-louder demands to reform the usual intent standards that apply in criminal en142
See, e.g., Gaynor et al., supranote 103, at 17-18 ('The government often tries to water down the knowledge standard by attempting to impose, through jury instructions, an
objective standard on the mens rea requirement, that is, to hold the defendant liable for
factual knowledge she should have had, rather than only for that she actually possessed.
However, it has been generally held that when a statute penalizes an act performed 'knowingly' there must be actualknowledge of the circumstances.... [T]he government should
not be able to argue that a person should have known for example, that the waste was hazardous, she should only be held liable if her subjective belief was that the waste was hazardous.") (citing non-environmental cases; citations omitted); Setuess, Statutory Interpretation of Clean Water Act Section 1319(c)(2)(A)'s Knowledge Requirement supra note 130, at 459
("Courts employ the ["public welfare" offense] doctrine to reduce or eliminate the criminal law's general requirement of mens read).
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vironmental statutes. The reason for this is simple: data supporting
the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is, as indicated previously,143 likely to
require a downward revision of the acceptable discharges of certain
toxic heavy metals like lead, cadmium, and manganese to levels currently deemed "sub-clinical." Such a downward revision will likely result in increased criminal prosecution of the manufacturing processes
using those metals. 144 In addition, as evermore definite data is released, criticism of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is likely to mount,
both from the left145 and right146 To the extent that neurotoxicity
data is used by government lawyers seeking to enforce a criminal environmental provision like that in the CWA (or by lawyers acting on behalf of clients or others pressuring the government to bring such
claims), pressure likely will mount for an "innocent activity"/ "specific
14'See supranotes 100-01 and accompanying text.
'44 Moreover, there is a solid basis for doing so in light of the more exacting standards
applied by other federal environmental statutes. For example, "liability under CERCLA
attaches regardless of the concentration of hazardous substances present in a defendant's
waste, so long as the defendant's waste and/or contaminants in it are 'listed hazardous
substances' pursuant to 40 C.FR. § 302.4(a). Numerous courts have [so] held." City of
New York v. Exxon Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474, 483 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
145 See generally Sheldon M. Novick, RacialImages of the "Criminal": A Cognitive Disorder,
22 VT. L. REv. 383 (1997) ;Joan Vogel, BiologicalTheories of Human Behavior: Admonitions of a
Skeptic, 22 VT. L. Rv. 425 (1997). Dr. Peter Breggin, a leading opponent of the use of
behavior-modifying psychotrophic drugs like Prozac and Ritalin, also opposes biological
explanations for behavior, which he characterizes as borne of "a long tradition that is potentially racist, ... disabling and humiliating to inner city youth." Telephone Interview
with Dr. Peter Breggin (Jan. 1,1998).
14 The celebrated political scientist James Q. Wilson, after reviewing what he sees as
the growing tension between science and law-or the conflict between explaining and
identifying causation versus judging behavior-concludes as follows:
[I1
t is important that we let neither science nor compassion decide legal precepts. We [social scientists] want to explain, the law seeks to judge; we want to
see the world in shades of gray, the law defines it in black and white. We wish
verdicts to encompass the full range of human circumstances, but the law can
range only so widely before losing its power to focus our often diffuse sense of
self-control. In extreme cases, where the law clearly does not fit, juries may
nullify and judges may forgive, but only within the steady, lasting confines of a
moral and legal order.
JAMms Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: Dos THE ABUSE EXCUSE THmEATEN OUR LEGAL
SYsTm? 112 (1997). See alsoJoELBEsT, RANDOM VIOLENCE: How WE TALx ABouT CRIMES

AND NEw VICTIMs 93-141 (1990). A considerably less restrained examination of the culture ofvictimhood appears in ALAN M. DER Howrrz, TH-E ABuSE ExCUSE AND OTHER COrOuTs, SOn SToRMzs, AND EVASIONS OF RES PONsIBIrY (1994). C. Ray Jeffery criticizes
traditional criminology for working on the basis of a medieval tradition of revenge and
deterrence through punishment and prisons rather than incorporating biosocial evidence.
See generallyJeffery, Ciminology and CriminalLaw, supranote 8.
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intent'Mike reading of a criminal environmental provision like the
CWA's.
This is problematic, however, because such an approach would
conflict with a plain meaning reading of the federal environmental
statutory standards. As noted above, these standards proscribe any
"knowing" violation. The possible result is widespread disagreement
about or, at worst, disregard of, federal statutory language. Such a result has obvious negative implications for an environmental statutory
regime founded on the rule of law.147
Therefore, it is essential to seek a possible solution for this likely
crisis in statutory interpretation. An effort is required that will both
accommodate new findings-such as neurotoxicity data-that bear on
the goal of a cleaner environment and also reduce the doctrinal confusion over the appropriate standard of intent in criminal environmental law cases. Possible solutions are outlined in Section III below.
B. CivilPenalties

Although this Article focuses primarily on the implications of
neurotoxicity research for criminal liability under federal environmental laws, it is useful to outline briefly the implications of neurotoxicity research for civil liability under those statutes. This is worthwhile
inasmuch as criminal prosecutions will in most cases be brought simultaneously with civil actions.
Civil liability under the CWA (and the other principal federal environmental statutes) is expansive, and has been made even more so
147

This is not a problem, it again deserves emphasizing, limited to the CWA. The same
concerns would arise with respect to RCRA. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786
E2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that "in a prosecution under 42 U.S.C. Sec.
6928(d) (1) it would be no defense to claim no knowledge that the paint waste was a hazardous waste within the meaning of the regulations; nor would it be a defense to argue
ignorance of the permit requirement"); United States v. Sellers, 926 E2d 410, 416 (5th Cir.
1991) (noting that "when a person knowingly possesses an instrumentality which by its
nature is potentially dangerous, he is imputed with the knowledge that it may be regulated
by public health legislation [such as 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928]."); United States v. Laughlin, 768
E Supp. 957,966 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "based upon the overall structure of section
6928(d) (2), Congress' objective in enacting RCRA of protecting public health and the
environment, and applicable principles of statutory construction, the court holds that the
government is not required to prove that defendants in this case knew that a permit was
required by law nor that they knew that (defendant] did not have a pernit in order to
prove that defendants violated section 6928(d) (2) (A)"), affd, 10 F.3d 961, 963-64 (2d Cir.
1993). But cf. United States v. Speach, 968 E2d 795, 797 (9th Cir., 1992) (holding that, in
light of ambiguity of "knowing" requirement with respect to 42 U.S.C. section 6928(d) (1),
finding mens rea "element conspicuously absent" with respect to transport of hazardous
materials to an unpermitted facility).
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by case law interpreting the statutes. 148 Although the statute's history
spans just over a full generation, it is full of examples of private efforts
to force the EPA and state regulators to implement standards in compliance with its sweeping commands. In light of the historically broad
reading of the CWA, the parties who would potentially be most affected by the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis would include government
regulators, as well as officers and other employees of large corporations. Therefore, as evidence mounts in support of the hypothesis,
private as well as public enforcement actions will likely increase.
It is again essential to repeat a key assumption underlying the
argument advanced in this Article. To be exact, this Article proceeds
on the assumption that as studies documenting the link between neurotoxic contamination and criminal behavior become more widely
disseminated, the EPA and state environmental authorities will be
compelled to lower the threshold for tolerable levels of discharged
heavy metals. Thus, in light of neurotoxicity data, currently "subclinical" levels will likely be reclassified as threatening to human health. 149
148See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (d) (West 1999). See also Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Train, 8 ERG 2120, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 20588 (D.D.C. 1976) (deciding a citizen suit
against EPA for failure to implement technology-based effluent limitations for toxic substances led to requirement that EPA issue such limitations).
14 It seems likely that this could happen. For example, in early 1999, EPA sought to
tighten the "reporting requirements for persistent bioaccumulative toxic [PBT] chemicals"
and "lowering the threshold for certain PBT pollutants and adding others to the list of
chemicals for which TRI reports must be filed." Sara Thurin Rollin, Toxic Pollutants:Environmental Groups Callfor StricterReporting to TRTfor Persistent Chemicals, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2086 (1999) (noting also that "environmental advocates faulted EPA's failure to include
lead and cadmium on the list of PBT substances subject to reporting").
For data gathered in support of the neurotoxicity hypothesis to have any bite would
likely require revision of the effluent standards for each of the toxic heavy metals implicated by the hypothesis. At present, the permissible effluent limitations vary considerably,
depending on the nature of the activity. Cf., e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 420.100 (West 1999) (allowing
lead discharges into publicly-owned treatment works to as much as 0.000751 kg/kkg); 40
C.F.R. § 41.6 7 (g) (West 1999) (stating that BPT (best practicable control technology]
effluent limitations for hard lead refining slag granulation allows no lead discharge).
These effluent limitations are arrived at, of course, only after often lengthy review and
comment. The data supporting the neurotoxicity hypothesis suggest, however, that established effluent limitations do not prevent lead poisoning sufficient to remove a co-factor
for violent behavior: "[a]lthough the effects of early exposure to low levels of lead are often described as subclinical, the evidence for serious cognitive defects is well established."
Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supranote 13, at 157. That is, "low" lead levels may still be
toxic in combination with other variables such as poor diet and drug use. Thus, even
though mean blood lead levels decreased seventy-seven percent between 1976 and 1991,
"many thousands of children continue to have toxic lead burdens, especially in minority
communities." Needleman et al.,
supra note 30, at 363. In part, it is fair to assume, this is
because lead has not been satisfactorily removed from public water supplies:
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Release of such revised standards seem certain to result in increased
private enforcement actions.
1. Clean Water Act
a. Statutory Scope
The plain language of the GWA gives authority for the EPA Administrator "to commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction for any violation." 5 0 In addition, citizen suits have become widely-used tools of GWA enforcement.151 It is worth noting, as well, that the list of persons subject to
prosecution under the CWA is broad. A federal employee acting
"within the scope of [his] employment" is subject to prosecution for
violation of the GWA.15 2 This has been applied, for instance, to the
director of a public utility with supervisory authority responsible for a
city waste water treatment plant 153 and civilians employed by the
154
armed forces.

Although regulation of leaded gas and paint may have reduced exposure
to solid or aerosol forms of lead, the presence of lead in water-a likely vector
influencing neonates and infants in inner cities and aging housing-has not
disappeared.... Even in modem multi-story buildings, water supplies in the
upper floors may be particularly high in lead.
Masters et al., Brain Biochemistry, supra note 13, at 157-58 (references omitted). It is easy to
imagine a lawsuit in which, for example, private interests would sue to compel the EPA to
include subclinical levels of lead and other toxic, heavy metals to be listed as national
effluent standards, requiring EPA to comply with its mandate under the CWA to protect
the integrity of the nation's waterways. The argument would be straightforward: these
levels have demonstrably been shown to compromise human health and therefore require
stricter regulation. Following revision of such standards, it is equally possible to imagine
violations of the new standards and resulting lawsuits.
I0 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).
11 See generally Washington Pub. Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills,
11 E3d 883 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing a citizen suit even when EPA administrative compliance152
order had also been issued).
SeeUnited States v. Curtis, 988 E2d 946, 948 (Alaska 1993).
15
3 See generallyUnited States v. Brittain, 931 E2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
154 See generally United States v. Dee, 912 E2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990). In Dee, the civilian
employees of the U.S. Army, assigned to the Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland were charged for noncompliance with certain RCRA waste reporting requirements. Defendants attempted to
assert that, as government employees, they were protected by sovereign immunity. However, the Fourth Circuit held that "sovereign immunity does not attach to individual government employees so as to immunize them from prosecution for their criminal acts." Id.

at 744.
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b. Interpretationand the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis
It is appropriate to discuss the applicability of the Neurotoxicity
Hypothesis to civil liability under the CWA because of its focus "on
implementation of technology-based standards applicable to individual point sources of water pollution-primarily industrial facilities
and public sewage treatment plants."155 In the context of the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, this is relevant for at least three reasons. First, if
effluent standards for toxic heavy metals like lead, manganese, and
cadmium are revised in light of the hypothesis, industrial facilities and
publicly-owned treatment works (POTWs) would be more likely to
violate permit terms. Second, in the event of revised effluent levels,
these same facilities would be likely targets of enforcement actions or
lawsuits. Third, however, because GWA enforcement has concentrated
on technology-forcing standards rather than watershed management,
industry would likely claim that the technology required to remove
heavy metals from point source discharges would be inefficient
and/or that the cost of achieving such standards is economically prohibitive. 156 Thus, although violations of permits would likely put such
facilities at risk of non-compliance with revised effluent levels, the fa1 57
cilities would have possible grounds for objection.
c. L.E.A.D. Group of Berks v. Exide Corp.
An example of the way neurotoxicity data could be used in a
GWA lawsuit is provided by the case of L.E.A.D. Group of Berks v. Exide

155 This approach contrasts, for example, with the approach of an otherwise quite similar statute, the GAA, which aims instead to control "a diversity of sources of air pollution

within regional airsheds." Robert W. Adler, IntegratedApproaches to Water Pollution: Lessons
from the CleanAirAc, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. Rev. 203, 207 (1999).
156 Cf Thomas A. Cinti, Note, The Regulator'sDilemma: Should Best Available Technology or
Cost Benefit Analysis Be Used to Determine the Applicable Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and
DisposalTechnology n 16 RtrrGERs CompuTR & T)ECs. LJ. 145, 158-63 (1990) (cataloguing
criticisms of BAT as inefficient); John D. Graham, The Failureof Ageny-Forcing The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 138-40
(1985) (criticizing BAT in the context of the CAA as inefficient). Graham argues that

"[tihere is never really a 'best' available technology; there are only progressively more
stringent and expensive abatement methods." Graham, supra, at 138-40.

157 Remember that this is only true if citizen-plaintiffs allege "a state of continuous or
intermittent violation-that is a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to
pollute in the future." In other words, "citizen suits for 'wholly past violations' are not
permitted under (Section 505] of the [OWA]." Massachusetts Pub. Interest Group v. ICI
Americas, Inc., 777 E Supp. 1032, 1034 (D. Mass. 1991) (citations omitted) (quoting

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57, 64 (1987)).
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Corp.158 In L.E.A.D., individual and other private plaintiffs sought relief
under the CWA, RCRA, and state hazardous waste and clean water
laws for claimed violations of, among other things, CWA permits. 15 9
The individual plaintiffs included people living near the manufacturing-including lead-battery making-facilities of defendants. They
maintained that the unpermitted release of toxic substances included
the toxic heavy metals antinomy, cadmium, lead, iron, copper, and
silver. To advance such claims, the court required plaintiffs to satisfy
the three-pronged constitutional standing test advanced in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife.160 Lujan requires a demonstration that a plaintiff
(a) suffered an injury-in-fact, (b) which is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and (c) that plaintiff's injuries likely
would be redressed by a favorable decision. 161 The court concluded
that the plaintiffs in this case did not satisfy the Lujan test, but for reasons unrelated to the discharge of the toxic heavy metals studied in
connection with the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis. 162 The court did find,
however, that claims under, inter alia, the CWA, were "redressable by
declaratory and injunctive relief," even though the allegedly harmful
discharges were "infrequent and episodic, rather than continuing and
ongoing violations."' 63 Moreover, the court affirmed that a local clean
environment group (the named plaintiff) had standing to sue equivalent to that of any individual plaintiff. 16
In the context of the preceding discussion about CWA and other
federal environmental criminal liability standards, the implications of
a case like LE.A.D. merit attention. Specifically, wider dissemination
of neurotoxicity research is likely to be seized upon first by individuals
seeking civil redress for environmental harms-individuals like those
168
See generally 1999 WL 124473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (slip op.). "L.E.A.D." stands for Local
Environmental Awareness Development.
159See generally id
160
See 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
161
See id.; L.E.A.D., 1999 WL 124473, at *12.
162
SeeL.E.A.D., 1999 WL 124473, at *12.
3
16
The court continued: "[wie hardly see the difference ...[e]ven if such violations
are episodic; they have continued and there is no guarantee that they will cease." Id. at
*19.
'eA In support of this conclusion, the Court relied on the Powell Duffryn test, which
provides that an organization may be sued so long as "(1) the organization's members
would have standing to sue on their own; (2) the interests that the organization seeks to
protect are germane to its purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires individual participation by its members." Id. at *20 (citing Public Interest
Research Group of NJ., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir.
1990)).
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in the LE.A.D. case. Such a push is likely to be especially acute with
neurotoxicity research because of the highly negative behavioral consequences of the toxic exposure. The likelihood of such lawsuits will
certainly lead to a demand for more stringent criminal prosecution of
those involved in industries that pollute with toxic heavy metals.
If the liability standards used to enforce such prosecutions are
not clarified, they will be subject to further inconsistent application.
Following the Supreme Court's lead in regulatory crime cases, some
courts can be expected to apply a common law general- and specificintent rubric. As in Weitzenhoff, however, other courts may continue to
struggle with the ambiguous definition of "knowing" acts in the
criminal liability provisions of the federal environmental statutes.
Thus, civil prosecutions of the federal environmental laws, whether
advanced by state officers or in private citizen suits, are likely to open
the door to greater uncertainty regarding the scope of the federal
criminal environmental standards. Even in the civil liability context,
therefore, neurotoxicity research underscores the need to amend
federal criminal environmental standards, in order to insure the longterm, popular credibility of environmental prosecutions.

I. THE SEARCH

FOR SoLUrIONS

A. The Model Penal Code, Neurotoxicity, andFederalEnvironmental
CriminalLiability
A way out of this impasse is to rethink the criminal intent standards used in federal environmental enforcement. One possible option is to make clear that the intent categories contained in the MPC
shall apply to the CWA's statutory definitions for criminal intent. This
approach has the advantage of discarding the common law analysis
that, as described in the previous section, has consistently proven so
nettlesome.
The common law categories of "general" and "specific intent"
stand in contrast to the "General Requirements for Culpability" set
forth in the MPC. 165 In particular, the MPC takes what has been
classified as an "elemental" approach to mens rea, meaning that a
prosecutor need not establish culpability in the sense that the defendant's actions demonstrated "his bad character, malevolence, or im165

MODEL

PENAL CODE

§ 2.02 (1980). Joshua Dressler observes that "[n]o aspect of

the Model Penal Code has had greater influence on the direction of American criminal

law" than this section. DRsssLP, supranote 76, at 120.
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morality.' ' 66 Instead, an elemental approach requires only that the
prosecution establish "the particular mental state provided for in the
definition of the offense." 167 Conceptually, the MPC's innovation requires more than proof of moral blameworthiness (a highly normative judgment); in addition, the MPC rejects the confusion of the
common law distinction between "general" and "specific intent"
crimes.
In their place, the MPC offers four statutory mens rea terms, including "knowingly," the mental state that must be established for
most federal environmental crimes. 168 The MPC defines "knowingly"
in two different ways, each of them with implications for the major
federal environmental crimes, particularly because a statute like the
169
CWA does not define "knowingly."
First, an actor "knowingly" causes a result if he "is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result."170 Consider the example of a battery-manufacturing plant. In the context of
a CWA criminal prosecution, a "knowing" release satisfying this standard would be one, for example, where a corporate officer performed
or authorized the release of lead-contaminated sludge into a point
source at levels in excess of permitted requirements, fully aware that
the release was not permitted and that lead has deleterious effects on
the nervous system and other vital functions.17 ' Alternately, one can
be found to act "knowingly" under the MPC if one is "aware that his
conduct is of that nature or that such [attendant] circumstances exist., 172

Awareness of the harmfulness of the conduct is central. 173 Thus,
in the example above, if the corporate officers in charge of discharges
into the point source did not know that the lead-contaminated sludge
contained lead in excess of permitted levels, they would not be guilty

166 DREssLER,
67

supra note 76, at 103.

1 Id (quotations without citations in original).
168The others are "purposely," "recklessly," and "negligently." See MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02.
16

9 As of 1990, it does, however, define "knowing endangerment," a separate criminal

offense from "knowing violations." See33 U.S.C. § 1319(3) (B) (i) (West 1999).
170 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (ii).
171 In the case of environmental lead, this would not be particularly difficult to establish. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
172 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (i).
173 See DnEssL a, supra note 76, at 122.
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of a "knowing" crime. If decided under this standard, a number of
environmental convictions may not have resulted in liability. 7 4
Importantly, however, the MPC requires proof of each and every
element of the crime, and conviction might still be possible under a
MPC standard in those cases where "attendant circumstances" are established. Even if a person was unaware of the conduct that caused
harm (the actual discharge in excess of permitted levels), it nonetheless might be possible to establish a "knowing" violation. For instance,
if the corporate officers in the above example knew that there had
been a problem at the facility with reducing the amount of lead in the
sludge to permitted levels, and had not taken efforts to address it, a
knowing violation might well be found.
Moreover, the MPC makes special provision for dealing with instances of "willful blindness."' 75Jurisdictions differ as to what can constitute willful blindness. In some jurisdictions, the MPC's willful
blindness proscription applies only if a person has "actual knowledge"
or a "correct belief' of the harmful act. Thus, for example, if the corporate officers in the above hypothetical noticed that sludge discharges from their plant were colored or textured in a way typical of
unpermitted lead discharges, they might be found to have personally
observed its presence and therefore to have had "actual knowledge."
Similarly, they might thus be said to have a "correct belief," even
though they did not definitively know-or have had "actual knowl176
edge"--of the unpermitted discharge.
A number of otherjurisdictions also allow a finding of knowledge
"ifthe person is aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact
in question, and he deliberately fails to investigate in order to avoid
confirmation of the fact."177 To again use the above hypothetical, willful blindness under the MPC would exist so as to establish a 'kowing" violation if a corporate officer noticed unusual sludge discharges
and failed to ask pertinent questions, while knowing full well that lead
is a health danger (this last claim is clearly one that would easily be
established for anyone in the industry).

74

See generallyUnited States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993).
175 SeeDREssLER, supra note 76, at 110.
176 Cf. id. at 109-10.
177 Id. at 110 (citing cases from the Fifth and Ninth federal circuits and from the Ne1

braska and North Carolina Supreme Courts); see also Eric A. Dubelier, Mens Rea Element in
the Prosecution of Export Control Cases After Ratlafu United States, 733 PLI/Comm. 791, 817
(Practicing Law Inst., Oct. 2, 1995) (discussing Weittenhoff 1 E3d at 1523).
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Readers may be struck by the extent to which the CWA's "knowing" standard is very much like the one applied in the vast majority of
criminal environmental prosecutions. That is, despite the Supreme
Court's effort to apply the common law categories of "general" and
"specific intent" in regulatory criminal prosecutions, as noted by
Mandiberg, 178 the lower courts, in fact, have applied a standard very
much like that advocated in the MPC. Contrary to Lazarus' suggestion, 179 then, rather than crafting an ultimately unworkable standard
in regulatory crimes cases, the lower courts have struggled to apply
federal criminal environmental standards according to a wellestablished and manageable analytical protocol.
A couple of examples make this clear. United States v. Boldt involved the criminal prosecution of managers of a plant that used toxic
metals to plate electronic circuit boards. 180 In Boldt, the defendant was
charged with a knowing criminal violation of the CWA when he permitted overflow from the company's "inadequate" wastewater pretreatment facilities to be discharged into the city sewer system. 8 1 The
overflow was completely untreated and contained toxic heavy metals.
The defendant insisted that he was not directly responsible for the
discharge. In a separate count, the defendant was charged with directing a subordinate to manually add a caustic chemical to a pretreatment tank and, when this effort was unsuccessful, to dump a tankful
of partially treated wastewater into the city sewer. With respect to
these charges, the defendant intimated that he felt he had little alternative since the tanks were about to overflow and, in any case, that he
was effectively prevented from stopping the discharge due to internal
18 2
corporate pressures.
The court disagreed, sustaining the defendant's conviction. As
for the defendant's tolerance of the direct discharge of untreated
toxic wastes, the court found that "the evidence showed that [defendant] was aware of the practice of bypassing the pollution control system and had condoned it on the occasion at issue."183 Regarding the
second charge that the defendant had ordered a subordinate to discharge partially treated toxic wastes, the court observed that "there is
no dispute that [defendant] directly ordered his subordinate to dump
8
17
See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
1
70 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.

180 See generally 929 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
181See id,
at 37.

182
See id at 38.
183 Ic1at 39.
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the copper wastewater." 8 4 In other words, the court disagreed with
the defendant's claims that any other alternative was impossible, or
that his actions were necessary.'8
In the context of the argument advanced in this Article, what is
especially striking about the Boldt analysis is the extent to which it applies the logic of the MPC for "knowing" criminal violations. In Boldt,
the defendant clearly was "aware that it [was] practically certain that
his conduct [would] cause" the result that led to his conviction, and
so satisfied the first prong of the MPC's analysis of "knowing"
crimes. 188 In addition, the defendant was "aware that his conduct
[was] of that nature or that such [attendant] circumstances exist,"
187
and therefore satisfied the awareness prong of the MPG's analysis.
Furthermore, under even the least generous of the willful blindness
tests adopted pursuant to the MPC, the eponymous defendant in Boldt
demonstrably had "actual knowledge" and a "correct belief" of the
harmful act, even though he did not actually perform the act. In
short, Boldt's culpability was appropriately established under the CWA
using an MPC analysis.
The same conclusion applies even where the facts are somewhat
more problematic in terms of applying the MPC's "knowing" standard. In United States v. Brittain, the defendant, a city public utilities
director, was found guilty at a jury trial of a criminal misdemeanor
violation of the CWA.18 8 In particular, he was charged with tolerating
discharges of raw sewage into a point source, and then directing a
subordinate not to report this permit violation to the EPA, as required
by the terms of the permit. Viewed in light of the MPG categories and
a "knowing" violation analysis, the facts of Brittain are problematic
only because the CWA then applied a "willful" or "negligent" standard
in the criminal section that today applies a "knowing" standard. 8 9
Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that although the defendant was
found guilty under a negligence standard, he would almost certainly
be found guilty if a "knowing" standard had been applied.

184 d.
185

SeeBoldt 929 F2d at 40.
6 MoDEL PENA CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (ii) (1980).
18
88 Id. § 2.02 (2) (b) (i).
18

See generally931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
see also Lazarus, Meeting the Demands, supranote 103, at 2454 (discussing the implications of a "willful" as opposed to a "knowing" environmental crime). But see
Schiffer & Simon, supra note 103, at 2531, 2536 (questioning Lazarus's view).
189See id. at 1418;
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This can be seen by looking at the facts leading to the defendant's conviction. The defendant was told that raw sewage was being
discharged from a permitted outfall, and "physically observed two
such discharges."' 9°As in Boldt, therefore, even though the defendant
did not personally perform actions that led to the discharge, he was
"aware that it [was] practically certain that his conduct [would] cause"
the result that led to his conviction and, again as in Boldt, demonstrated the awareness of the consequences of his conduct needed to
establish a "knowing" CWA violation. 191 The court further offered observations that left little doubt as to the defendant's "knowing" violation under the OWA's MPG-like analysis:
[D]efendant had primary operational responsibility for the
treatment plant.... Defendant was informed that such illegal discharges were prone to occur during heavy rains and
that he reviewed logs *recording repeated illegal discharges.... It appears from the plant supervisor's testimony
that he discussed illegal discharges with defendant several
times over a period of years and that the discharges were
92
never reported.
Given such facts, it is unnecessary to perform a "willful blindness"
analysis; the defendant's actions clearly satisfied the basic "knowing"
violation elements.
The advantage of applying these MPC standards in the case of
federal environmental criminal prosecutions-instead of the common
law "general" and "specific intent" standards-is that they provide
greater intellectual clarity. They do so in two ways. First, they remove
the judgment as to the degree of harm a person causes to the public
welfare. Second, demonstration of some additional malicious intent is
not required. 193 Thus, adoption of the MPC standards uses a more objective standard than does the common law of "general" and "specific
intent."
This distinction, in turn, would help resolve the central concern
about environmental liability noted by the Weitznhoff court, namely

19 0

Bittain, 931 F.2d at 1418.

191MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (b) (ii).
1912 Brittain,931 E2d at 1420.

193
That is, the key questions asked to determine if a defendant had the requisite "special" intent are removed.
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the question of whether "knowingly" means a knowing violation of the
194
law or simply knowing conduct that is violative of the law.
Ideally, to insure the continuing credibility of criminal prosecutions under the GWA and similar federal environmental statutes, congressional statutory amendment is desirable. Specifically, the "knowing" and "knowing endangerment" standards require explicit
definition according to MPG standards. Thus, federal environmental
statutes should clarify that in order to establish a "knowing" violation
it is necessary either to demonstrate a defendant's certainty that a result will follow from actions or, at a minimum, satisfy the Code's concept of "willful blindness."
Alternately, statutory amendment might clarify the approach
taken in United States v.Johnson & Towers, Inc.195 In that case, the court
concluded that a knowing environmental crime is one where defendants knew that the activity in which they were engaged required a
permit but that they failed to obtain one. In addition, however, the
court added that while this approach required prosecutors to demonstrate that all elements of the offense were "knowing," "the district
court may also instruct the jury that such knowledge may be inferred."196 Such an approach is consistent with both the statutory language and a MPC-influenced reading of the statute that dispenses
with "general" and "specific intent"-like readings, and would emphasize the need to know of an actual permit, thereby allowing for good
faith errors. Thus, even in light of neurotoxicity-informed discharge
standards, such an amendment would likely result in fewer prosecutions. The possibility of inferring knowledge, however-if, for example, a person's job responsibilities suggest that they should have
known that an activity was permitted-would target real malefactors.
This approach would put a greater burden on regulators than on the
regulated by focusing on the permit itself rather than on the nature
of the harm.

194 Seegenerally United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 .d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993).
195 See generally 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984). Although Johnson & Towers is a RCRA case,

the similar structure of the "knowing" language means that this point applies with equal
force to other federal environmental criminal provisions like that of the CWA. See generally
id.
19
Id. at 670. It seems likely that mere position in an organization is likely not enough

to infer knowiedge; rather, some amount of intent probably need be shown. See, e.g., United
States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 E2d 35, 40-56 (1st Cir. 1991); HARMs ET
Al.., supranote 135, § 5.08.
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B. ConcernsAbout Statutory Reform
This is not to suggest, however, that statutory amendments explicitly defining knowledge in terms of MPC standards would entirely resolve concerns about federal environmental criminal liability. While
the more objective MPG standards represent an improvement over
the common law criminal liability standards, they are far from perfect,
since an inquiry into a defendant's awareness may result in some degree of subjective assessment as to motive-sometimes based entirely
on circumstantial evidence and inferences from that evidence.
Nonetheless, the MPC standards unquestionably represent an
improvement over the use of liability standards derived from the
common law. Imagine, for instance, facts similar to those in Boldt or
Brittain but involving releases of lead, cadmium, or manganese at levels once classified as "sub-clinical" but, in light of evidence supporting
the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis, were recently classified by the EPA as
levels below which discharges are not permitted. Further imagine
that, knowing of this recent reclassification but disagreeing with it,
believing such reclassification to be an instance of unnecessary, overzealous regulation, a lead battery manufacturing plant supervisor allowed discharge of toxic sludge into a point source at an unpermitted
level. In that event, as Boldt and Brittain make clear, a criminal conviction under section 1319 of the OWA would be appropriate. Moreover,
as the above analysis suggests, such a conviction would accord with the
MPC definitions for the OWA's statutory standards, although not with
the common law regulatory protocol recently articulated by the Supreme Court.
Finally, another alternative raised by the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is that criminal penalties for discharges should be reduced, provided that environmental statutes are correspondingly revised to increase civil penalties. For instance, as indicated previously, neurotoxicity researchers posit that preventing neurotoxic contamination
that may lead to violent criminal behavior may be relatively inexpensive. 19 7
CONCLUSION

The above analysis confirms that further data validating the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is likely to result in increased convictions under
the GWA and other federal environmental statutes, assuming revised
197See supranote 28 and accompanying text.
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discharge standards. Such convictions, importantly, will occur because
it will be possible to satisfy the MPG-influenced mental state requirements contained in the OWA's principal criminal provision. Arguably,
this is a fair result. On the one hand, the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is
likely to lead to a heightened degree of responsibility for industries
that handle neurotoxic metals, at a risk of criminal prosecution. On
the other hand, if such prosecutions proceed under federal statutes
that clearly define "knowing" violations according to MPG mens rea
standards, industries will not face the uncertain and highly subjective
possibility of being classified as "public welfare" offenders. In the
event that the volume of neurotoxicity-related prosecutions under the
environmental statutes increases, violators could be forced to help pay
for the costs of preventing future contamination by making significant
contributions to nutrition and preventative medical programs, in addition to reducing discharges of toxic materials.
To the extent that neurotoxicity data remains controversial, for
the reasons outlined above, 198 an increase in such prosecutions could
well lead to increased calls from industries that use any of these toxic
elements in their production to amend the GWA and other federal
environmental criminal laws; industry's demand surely would be to
make it much more difficult to secure convictions. It can only be
198 This is not to say that, even if federal environmental criminal liability standards are
made less ambiguous, that no problems are likely to arise, This is likely to be especially
true in instances in which convictions are sought despite the defendant's lack of knowledge about having committed a legal violation. For example, in the above hypothetical,
suppose that in light of increased contamination to a public waterway, the facility was ordered to cut its discharge of toxics-contaminated waste in half. Suppose that, as in the case
of CaliforniaPublic InterestResearch Group v. Shell Oil Co., 840 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(which, it should be noted, involved only civil violations of the GWA), the EPA permit revised the facility's discharge of combined lead and cadmium waste to ten pounds per day,
such limits "intended to be a cap on current performance." Further assume that the facility admits that it was in violation of the ten pounds per day standard, but claims that it
cannot be liable for a knowing violation unless both the numeric standard and the "narrative" standard-meaning the language referring to the cap on current performance-are
exceeded. This is because, the defendant facility maintains, the revised permit allows for
liability "only if there is a change in its 'current performance' or operations." Id. at 716.
Notwithstanding the lawyerly quality of such a contention, it is fair to observe that, even
under MPG standards, a defendant might well have doubted whether she/he was in violation of a permit so long as ambiguity existed in the terms of the permit, and therefore
would maintain that no "knowing" violation occurred, despite knowing that the discharged
substances were of concern as possible health threats. A solution to such a concern may be
more careful drafting of unambiguous permits. The facts of Shell Oil suggest that this will
be especially important as the neurotoxicity hypothesis is further supported, in light of the
probability that it will result in increased criminal environmental prosecutions, or at least
the possibility of them. See id.
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hoped, however, that as the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis is more convincingly supported with hard evidence, the need for the-very real
threat of criminal prosecution-or some comparable civil deterrentwill continue to be recognized. The overwhelming social interest in
maintaining the recent, celebrated declines in violent criminal behavior should never be forgotten. 19
The data undergirding the Neurotoxicity Hypothesis mounts
every month, and therefore demands the attention of lawyers and
policymakers. At the very least, it will present real challenges to those
who continue to insist upon the importance of the notion of mens rea
as a-if not the-fundamental tenet of our system of criminal justice.
That is, if violent criminals can establish significant evidence of childhood neurotoxic contamination, they will have powerful affirmative
defenses to any charges brought against them. This will' certainly be
true at the sentencing stage, if less so at the conviction stage.
Similarly, the demonstrated link between neurotoxicity and crime
likely will result in the increased conviction of those responsible for
neurotoxic damage. This Article has outlined some of the ways in
which this is so. It is hoped that the Article will also go some distance
towards furthering the call for clarification of the liability standards
contained in our nation's federal environmental laws. Failure to do so
risks calling the fundamental integrity (and successful application) of
those laws into serious question.

19

See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.

